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Conflict of Laws for the Age of Cybertorts:  
A Game-Theoretic Study of Corporate Profiteering 
from Choice of Law Loopholes and Interstate Torts 
Yunsieg P. Kim* 
This Article identifies a choice of law loophole that 
corporations can exploit to commit interstate torts against 
individuals without paying damages—by inducing victims to sue 
in a state where they are guaranteed to lose. The Second 
Restatement effectively requires plaintiffs bringing interstate tort 
claims to allege which state has the most significant relationship 
to their injury, because most federal courts rely on plaintiffs’ 
allegations to choose a state law for the purpose of resolving 
motions to dismiss. However, when torts are committed over state 
lines (for example, over the internet), plaintiffs can be 
misinformed or misled as to where the tortious conduct really 
occurred, even if their knowledge of how they were harmed is 
otherwise correct. Therefore, if a plaintiff is induced to sue under 
a wrong state’s law, she would waste years litigating only to lose, 
even if her claims are meritorious. Her complaint would survive a 
motion to dismiss because her allegations are plausible, but it 
would be dismissed at discovery, where it would become apparent 
that her injury originated in a state other than the one she alleged. 
This Article has two objectives. First, I show how corporations 
committing torts remotely can profit from this loophole, using  
a game-theoretic model and a Third Circuit case in which a 
corporate defendant apparently misrepresented to the court and 
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plaintiffs the state where the alleged tort originated, resulting in 
the plaintiffs’ complaint surviving a motion to dismiss but being 
dismissed after discovery years later. I argue that, if corporations 
use this loophole often enough, tort victims would be deterred from 
suing for fear that they would waste years trying cases they are 
effectively guaranteed to lose. Thus, once a corporation has built a 
reputation that it will use the loophole, it could commit torts 
without paying damages or even having to litigate. 
Second, I use my study as evidence against the prevailing 
notion that conflict of laws scholarship is unhelpful to the practice 
of law. I argue that conflicts scholarship has become notorious for 
irrelevance because too many scholars employ logically fallacious 
argumentation and are overly concerned with designing 
theoretically ideal but practically infeasible choice of law rules.  
I argue that, by focusing more on studying how existing choice of 
law rules affect actual litigation, conflicts scholarship can lead the 
effort to fix our territorially tethered, increasingly unsustainable 
legal system and to design one fit to survive the age of cybertorts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
[C]onflict of laws is a dismal swamp . . . inhabited by . . . 
eccentric professors who theorize about mysterious matters 
in a strange and incomprehensible jargon. 
—William L. Prosser,1 1953   
[T]he scholarly consensus [is] that choice-of-law doctrine is 
an unsalvageable mess. 
—Katherine Florey,2 2015 
Depending on whom one asks, conflict of laws dates to the rise 
of the Roman Republic3 or to the fall of the Holy Roman Empire.4 
Compared to classical Mediterranean merchants and medieval 
fiefdoms, people and states of the Internet Age interact over 
borders much more often.5 As more interstate dealings cause more 
 
 1. William L. Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 MICH. L. REV. 959, 971 (1953). 
 2. Katherine Florey, Big Conflicts Little Conflicts, 47 ARIZ. STATE L.J. 683, 685 (2015). 
 3. Giesela Rühl, Methods and Approaches in Choice of Law: An Economic Perspective,  
24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 801, 815 (2006) (“The beginnings of . . . choice of law are to be  
found in Roman times . . . in the 3rd century B.C.”); see 1 COLEMAN PHILLIPSON,  
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CUSTOM OF ANCIENT GREECE AND ROME 277 (1911) 
(explaining that Ancient Rome allowed foreigners to settle disputes according to the laws of 
their origin). 
 4. American Slavery and the Conflict of Laws, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 74, 82 (1971)  
(“[T]he disintegration of the Holy Roman Empire and the appearance of the nation-states 
gave rise to a countervailing notion of international law, upon which, in a sense, modern 
conflicts is based.”). 
 5. See ANNA MANCINI, ANCIENT EGYPTIAN WISDOM FOR THE INTERNET:  
ANCIENT EGYPTIAN JUSTICE AND ANCIENT ROMAN LAW APPLIED TO THE INTERNET 10 (2002) 
(explaining that legal systems in Ancient Egypt and Rome were organized territorially but 
the internet “cuts down the costs of international communication”); Søren Michael Sindbæk, 
The Small World of the Vikings: Networks in Early Medieval Communication and Exchange,  
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interstate disputes, one might expect conflict of laws—the 
discipline that decides which state’s law governs an interstate 
dispute—to become more important. However, more scholars and 
practitioners are discrediting American conflict of laws scholarship 
with each passing decade.6 Why has conflict of laws scholarship 
fallen into disuse in both theory and practice when it should be 
more useful than ever before? 
It may seem futile to ask why conflict of laws is declining, 
because so many have already complained for so long that conflicts 
scholarship is unhelpful, irrelevant, or unintelligible. In 1967, 
Professor Maurice Rosenberg quipped that choice of law doctrine 
is about as useful to practice as a Ouija board.7 In the half-century 
since, conflicts scholars have acknowledged that their own 
discipline can seem to be “an ossified body of doctrine that fails to 
supply coherent answers” to real-world problems,8 or “as abstruse 
as determining the number of angels who can dance on the head of 
a pin.”9 Professor William Reynolds even writes that “[c]hoice of 
law today, both the theory and practice of it, is universally said to 
be a disaster.”10 
This Article’s first objective is to show that conflicts scholarship 
can address practical problems confronting the Internet Age.  
To that end, I examine a loophole in conflict of laws and civil 
procedure practice that corporate tortfeasors can exploit to evade 
paying damages to their victims. In Maniscalco v. Brother Int’l Corp., 
the defendant corporation’s affiliate in Japan (BIL) allegedly 
committed a tort that remotely harmed U.S. residents.11  
 
40.1 NORWEGIAN ARCHAEOLOGICAL REV. 59, 60, 71 (2007) (“[T]he growth of electronic 
communication, especially the Internet, has triggered a rapid development in the 
understanding of communication. . . . The critical difference between the early medieval and 
the modern worlds was not the scale of connections but their pervasiveness . . . .”). 
 6. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. 
 7. Maurice Rosenberg, Two Views on Kell v. Henderson: An Opinion for the New York 
Court of Appeals, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 459, 460 (1967). 
 8. David L. Noll, The New Conflicts Law, 2 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 41, 47 (2014). 
 9. John B. Austin, A General Framework for Analyzing Choice-of-Law Problems in Air 
Crash Litigation, 58 J. AIR L. & COM. 909, 980 (1993). 
 10. William L. Reynolds, Legal Process and Choice of Law, 56 MD. L. REV. 1371, 1371 (1997). 
 11. See Maniscalco v. Brother Int’l Corp. (USA) (Maniscalco III), 793 F. Supp. 2d 696, 
698, 704 (D.N.J. 2011); Maniscalco v. Brother Int’l (USA) Corp. (Maniscalco IV), 709 F.3d 202 
(3d Cir. 2013). 
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Apparently unaware that the alleged tort occurred in Japan,12 the 
plaintiffs sued under the law of New Jersey, where Brother 
International Corporation (BIC) is headquartered.13 Although the 
complaint was plausible enough to survive a motion to dismiss,14 
BIC apparently knew that the alleged wrongful conduct occurred 
in Japan, not New Jersey.15 Hence, regardless of the case’s merits, 
BIC could have moved to dismiss by revealing that the plaintiffs 
sued under the law of a wrong state.16 However, even though 
BIC did successfully move to dismiss on the choice of law issue, 
it did so only after the case went to discovery.17 Why did BIC 
protract for years18 a case that it could have gotten dismissed 
almost immediately? 
I argue that BIC deliberately protracted the case to prevent the 
plaintiffs from suing again under the correct state’s law. To move 
to dismiss for incorrect choice of law, BIC must argue that the case 
is better connected to a state other than New Jersey.19 To do so, BIC 
 
 12. The plaintiff’s complaint does not allege tortious conduct originating in Japan. 
Complaint, Maniscalco v. Brother Int’l Corp. (USA), 2008 WL 2559365 (D.N.J. June 26, 2008) 
(No. 3:06-cv-04907). When the district court partially denied BIC’s motion to dismiss and 
thus ruled that New Jersey law applies to some of the plaintiff’s claims, the court did not cite 
any allegations of tortious conduct originating in Japan. See Maniscalco v. Brother Int’l Corp. 
(USA) (Maniscalco II), 627 F. Supp. 2d 494 (D.N.J. 2009). The court refers to the fact that the 
defendant’s tort originated in Japan only after “the Court ha[d] at its disposal the discovery 
provided by the parties.” Maniscalco III, 793 F. Supp. 2d at 707 n.4. 
 13. Maniscalco IV, 709 F.3d at 204. 
 14. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007) (“[A] claim requires a 
complaint with enough factual matter to suggest an agreement. Asking for plausible grounds 
. . . simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal 
evidence of illegal agreement.”); Maniscalco II, 627 F. Supp. 2d at 499 (“Because the Court 
finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged the three [New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act] 
elements, BIC’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ [New Jersey] CFA claims is denied.”). 
 15. See Maniscalco III, 793 F. Supp. 2d at 699. 
 16. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d); for a more detailed discussion on when and how a court 
can consider extrinsic evidence introduced by the defendant in ruling on a motion to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim, see infra Section I.A. 
 17. See supra note 12 and accompanying text; Maniscalco III, 793 F. Supp. 2d at 710 
(dismissing the suit because “New Jersey law does not apply” and the “relevant decisions 
[regarding the alleged wrongful conduct] were not made in New Jersey, but in Japan”). 
 18. Maniscalco v. Brother Int’l Corp. (USA) (Maniscalco I), 2008 WL 2559365, at *3 
(D.N.J. June 26, 2008) (stating that the plaintiffs “filed suit in October 2006”); Maniscalco III, 
793 F. Supp. 2d at 710 (dismissing the suit in 2011 because “New Jersey law does not apply”). 
 19. See Maniscalco III, 793 F. Supp. 2d at 707 (“Under 148(2) [of the Restatement 
(Second) of the Conflict of Laws], a Court must weigh various ‘contacts’ between Plaintiffs’ 
fraud claims and the relevant states to determine which state has the greatest ties to  
the claims.”). 
1.KIM_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)  3/11/2021  12:54 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 46:2 (2021) 
334 
 
must effectively reveal where the alleged tort really took place. If 
BIC moved to dismiss too early, the plaintiffs could use that 
information to sue again under an appropriate state’s law. 
However, if BIC protracted the plaintiffs’ suit under New Jersey 
law long enough, the plaintiffs would not have any resources left 
with which to sue again, even after they learn that the alleged tort 
occurred in Japan. Indeed, when BIC’s motion to dismiss was 
pending, BIC argued that the choice of law is “best left for 
resolution later,”20 indicating an intent to delay revealing the case’s 
contacts to Japan. The court denied BIC’s motion to dismiss and 
spent two more years on the case, only to dismiss it for incorrect 
choice of law after conducting full discovery.21 I call this tactic the 
Maniscalco exploit (“ME” or “the exploit”) after the cases that 
indicate its existence. 
The Maniscalco exploit arises from a defect in choice of law and 
civil procedure practice. When courts address a choice of law 
question at the pleading stage, they often rely on plaintiffs’ 
allegations of fact.22 A factual allegation critical to the choice of law 
is the state where the act causing the injury took place.23 In cases 
 
 20. See Maniscalco v. Brother Int’l Corp. (USA) (Maniscalco II), 627 F. Supp. 2d 494,  
499 n.2 (D.N.J. 2009) (“BIC contends that New Jersey law should not apply to this case but 
BIC suggests that this issue is best left for resolution later. . . . Accordingly, the Court will not 
address it here.”). 
 21. The trial court denied in part BIC’s motion to dismiss on June 19, 2009. Id. at 494. 
The court dismissed for incorrect choice of law on June 24, 2011. See Maniscalco III,  
793 F. Supp. 2d at 696. One of the plaintiffs appealed, which was dismissed on March 8, 2013.  
See Maniscalco v. Brother Int’l (USA) Corp. (Maniscalco IV), 709 F.3d 202, 204 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 22. See, e.g., Reginella Constr. Co. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., 949 F. Supp. 2d 
599, 607 (W.D. Pa. 2013) (relying on the plaintiff’s allegations of fact to conduct choice of law 
analysis in the course of considering a motion to dismiss). 
 23. The place of the wrong is either the decisive factor or a significant factor in the 
choice of law decision under the First and Second Restatements. See Restatement (First) of 
Conflict of Laws § 377 (1934) (“The place of wrong is in the state where the last event 
necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place.”); Restatement (Second) of 
Conflict of Laws § 145 (1971) (“Contacts to be taken into account . . . include . . . the place 
where the conduct causing the injury occurred.”). States using the First Restatement have 
defined the place of the wrong as the state where wrongful conduct occurred, not the state 
in which harm resulting from wrongful conduct was suffered. See, e.g., Cremi v. Brown, 955 
F. Supp. 499, 524 (D. Md. 1997), aff’d sub nom. Banca Cremi, S.A. v. Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc., 
132 F.3d 1017 (4th Cir. 1997) (applying the law of the state in which “the alleged 
misrepresentations . . . occurred” instead of the law of the state in which the loss resulting 
from the misrepresentations was felt). States using the Second Restatement, in the choice of 
law inquiry, have also distinguished between the state in which wrongful conduct occurred 
and the state in which injury resulted from that wrongful conduct. See Maniscalco IV,  
709 F.3d at 208. 
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like car accidents, the plaintiffs usually know where the tortious act 
took place because they witness it.24 However, in cases like 
Maniscalco in which the alleged tort occurs in another state, the 
plaintiffs may not know where it happened.25 Yet, current practice 
addresses the choice of law issue at pleading, relying on plaintiffs’ 
potentially inaccurate knowledge of where a tortious act 
occurred,26 or after pleading and full discovery,27 which would 
protract cases that should have been disposed of at the pleading 
stage for incorrect choice of law. For example, the Maniscalco court 
denied a motion to dismiss relying on the claim that the act 
occurred in New Jersey28 but dismissed after discovery pointed to 
Japan.29 Hence, the plaintiffs wasted years on a futile case because 
they could not correctly allege where the tortious act occurred, even 
though they alleged who harmed them and how the harm occurred 
plausibly enough to survive a motion to dismiss. 
The Maniscalco exploit is important because it helps 
corporations evade liability for, and thereby reliably profit from, 
committing interstate torts against individuals. Consider a 
company that harms its customers in the course of selling its 
products. Without the Maniscalco exploit, this hypothetical 
company should not expect to evade liability so easily, because its 
victims are likely to sue and because their claims are likely to 
survive a motion to dismiss. The victims are likely to sue because 
they would know who harmed them: unlike the typical tortfeasor 
 
 24. See, e.g., Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc. v. Chappell, 304 F. Supp. 2d 639, 644–45  
(E.D. Pa. 2004) (applying Pennsylvania law to a case arising from a car accident that occurred 
in Pennsylvania, under the most significant relationship test). 
 25. See Jacqueline D. Lipton, Combating Cyber-Victimization, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1103, 1113 (2011) (“A cyber-attacker can also be physically removed from the victim. He may 
be . . . even across the globe.”). 
 26. See, e.g., Holborn Corp. v. Sawgrass Mut. Ins. Co., 304 F. Supp. 3d 392, 398–400 
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (conducting a choice of law analysis on the basis of the plaintiffs’ allegations 
of fact at the motion to dismiss stage). 
 27. See, e.g., Snyder v. Farnam Cos., 792 F. Supp. 2d 712, 717–18 (D.N.J. 2011) (ruling 
that choice of law analysis for breach of warranty claims was premature at the motion to 
dismiss stage). 
 28. See Maniscalco v. Brother Int’l Corp. (USA) (Maniscalco II), 627 F. Supp. 2d 494, 499 
(D.N.J. 2009) (“Because the Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged the three  
[New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act] elements, BIC’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ CFA claims 
is denied.”). 
 29. See Maniscalco v. Brother Int’l Corp. (USA) (Maniscalco III), 793 F. Supp. 2d 696, 
710 (D.N.J. 2011). 
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who remotely harms residents of other states,30 this company 
cannot hide behind anonymity to evade liability because it has an 
interest in selling its goods under its own brand.31 The plaintiffs’ 
claims are likely to survive pleading because they are likely to 
know how they were harmed: the Maniscalco plaintiffs, for 
example, were able to allege how they were harmed specifically 
enough to survive motions to dismiss under plausibility pleading.32  
However, if the victims can be induced to sue in a state that has 
no genuine contacts with the alleged tort, their case would be 
dismissed for incorrect choice of law regardless of its merits. 
Specifically, a corporate tortfeasor would use its multistate 
presence to obfuscate the true origin of the tort to its victims and to 
induce them to sue under the law of a state where they would lose 
on the choice of law—a state in which neither the tortious act nor 
the victims’ injury occurred. Once the victims sue in a dummy state, 
the tortfeasor would protract the futile suit to drain their funds. In 
Maniscalco, the defendant’s U.S. affiliate was headquartered in New 
Jersey, home to “one of the strongest consumer protection laws in 
the nation.”33 Apparently unaware that their injury originated in 
Japan,34 the plaintiffs sued unsuccessfully in New Jersey instead of 
a state in which they suffered the injury (California or South 
Carolina), where they could have won on the choice of law.35  
The Maniscalco exploit promises to be all the more profitable now, 
 
 30. See Michael S. Vogel, Unmasking “John Doe” Defendants: The Case Against Excessive 
Hand-Wringing over Legal Standards, 83 OR. L. REV. 795, 821 (2004) (“[A]nonymity can also be 
a substantial aid to tortious conduct.”). 
 31. Cf. Louis E. Boone & David L. Kurtz, ESSENTIALS OF CONTEMPORARY BUSINESS 8 
(2013) (“Companies also discovered the need to distinguish their goods and services from 
those of competitors.”). 
 32. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 33. Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 647 A.2d 454, 460 (N.J. 1994); see also Baher Azmy & 
David Reiss, Modeling a Response to Predatory Lending: The New Jersey Home Ownership Security 
Act of 2002, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 645, 665 (2004); William J. Diggs, Consumer Protection in an eBay 
Marketplace: An Analysis of the Supreme Court of New Jersey’s Radir Wheels Decision to Extend 
Liability Under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act to Individual eBay Sellers, 40 SETON HALL  
L. REV. 811, 811 (2010). 
 34. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 35. See infra notes 77–79 and accompanying text. 
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when the internet makes it easier both to commit interstate torts36 
and to conceal one’s physical location.37 
Despite the Maniscalco exploit’s significance, neither conflict of 
laws nor civil procedure scholarship has studied it. Existing works 
in conflict of laws neglect the exploit because, for at least fifty years, 
scholars have debated what an ideal choice of law rule should look 
like38 rather than how flaws in current choice of law rules affect 
individual litigation results. Existing works in civil procedure do 
not study the exploit because they focus on a different kind of 
information asymmetry. Much of the work on the so-called 
paradox of pleading argues that many plaintiffs cannot file 
complaints that survive pleading because the facts they need to 
make plausible claims are held by the defendants.39 Although the 
paradox of pleading is indeed grave harm to plaintiffs with valid 
claims, many of its victims at least avoid costly litigation because 
the lack of the facts they need to survive a motion to dismiss deters 
them from suing.40 In contrast, victims of the exploit would sue, 
 
 36. See, e.g., Christopher P. Beall, Comment, The Scientological Defenestration of  
Choice-of-Law Doctrines for Publication Torts on the Internet, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUT. & INFO. 
L. 361, 365 (1997) (“Choice-of-law issues arise with respect to torts committed via the Internet 
because interstate communication is so much more prevalent and effortless in that network 
of networks.”). 
 37. Granted, the means to conceal one’s location over the internet may not be 
foolproof. See Margot Kaminski, Real Masks and Real Name Policies: Applying Anti-Mask Case 
Law to Anonymous Online Speech, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 815, 822 (2012) 
(“The . . . switch to IPv6 makes it even harder to go untraced online in the absence of 
deliberately deploying anonymizing software like Tor.”). However, the Maniscalco exploit 
is expected to work more often than not because “[i]t is difficult for unsophisticated, private 
victims of Internet harassment to use tort law . . . as a remedy to Internet 
harassment. . . . Internet-specific issues—including the . . . need to unmask possible 
defendants . . . exacerbate the expense and difficulty of litigation.” Winhkong Hua, 
Cybermobs, Civil Conspiracy, and Tort Liability, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1217, 1229 (2017). 
 38. See, e.g., BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 189 (1963) 
(arguing that courts should apply the law of the state with the strongest policy interest in a 
case); Kermit Roosevelt III & Bethan Jones, What a Third Restatement of Conflict of Laws Can 
Do, 110 AJIL UNBOUND 139, 143 n.19 (2016) (debating the normative merits of the Third 
Restatement’s proposed two-step process to choice of law). 
 39. See, e.g., Rakesh N. Kilaru, Comment, The New Rule 12(b)(6): Twombly, Iqbal, and 
the Paradox of Pleading, 62 STAN. L. REV. 905, 927 (2010) (“Civil rights plaintiffs alleging 
motive-based torts . . . cannot state a claim because they do not have access to documents . . . 
and they cannot get access . . . without stating a claim.”). 
 40. Cf. Jenna Wims Hashway, Litigation Loansharks: A History of Litigation Lending and 
a Proposal to Bring Litigation Advances Within the Protection of Usury Laws, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS 
U. L. REV. 750, 758 (2012) (“[P]laintiffs’ attorneys who work on a contingent fee basis screen 
their potential cases and accept only those with a high likelihood of success . . . .”). 
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survive pleading, and see their case dismissed for incorrect choice 
of law after spending years on it, because they know enough about 
how they were harmed to make plausible claims, but not enough 
about where the tort occurred to sue under a correct state’s law. 
This Article fills that gap in choice of law and civil procedure 
literature by using a game-theoretic model to study the workings 
and consequences of the Maniscalco exploit. I build a formal model 
using Maniscalco’s fact pattern, as opposed to gathering empirical 
data on how the exploit is used, because the exploit is likely to be 
unobservable in the long run. If the exploit is used often enough, 
plaintiffs might not sue in the long run because they expect to waste 
money on a case they will lose. If a mere threat to use the exploit is 
enough to deter litigation, observed instances of the exploit would 
understate its actual prevalence and impact. After modeling the 
exploit, I present as a solution to it flashlight discovery limited to 
the choice of law question conducted while a motion to dismiss is 
pending, so that plaintiffs would find out early whether they would 
lose on the choice of law issue if they proceeded to trial. In contrast, 
the prevailing practice would deny a motion to dismiss a plausible 
case, conduct full discovery, then dismiss for incorrect choice of 
law.41 I then model the consequences of implementing this solution. 
As briefly introduced so far and as will be shown in more detail, 
Maniscalco establishes that conflicts scholarship can address a 
salient practical problem: namely, a procedural defect that would 
allow companies to profit from interstate torts. However, conflicts 
scholarship is still considered to be anything but practically useful. 
Courts have shown that “methodology rarely drives judicial 
decisions.”42 Twenty-four states have dropped the discipline from 
their bar exams.43 Even conflicts scholars admit that this “venerable 
 
 41. See, e.g., Arroyo v. Milton Acad., No. 10–cv–117, 2011 WL 65938, at *3 (D. Vt. Jan. 
10, 2011) (declining to conduct “choice-of-law analysis” because “it would be premature . . . 
before the completion of discovery”). 
 42. Eugene F. Scoles, Peter Hay, Patrick J. Borchers & Symeon C. Symeonides, 
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2.19, at 83 (4th ed. 2004); see also Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law 
in the American Courts in 1994: A View “From the Trenches,” 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 2 (1995)  
(“[O]f all the factors that may affect the outcome of a conflicts case, the factor that is  
the most inconsequential is the choice-of-law methodology followed by the court.” 
(emphasis omitted)). 
 43. Laura E. Little, Conflict of Laws Structure and Vision: Updating a Venerable Discipline, 
31 GA. STATE U. L. REV. 231, 233–34 (2015). 
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discipline” is in decline44 and have for decades discussed how to 
“rethink”45 and “reform”46 conflict of laws, seemingly to no avail. 
Thus, I return to the question posed at the beginning of this Article: 
Why is conflict of laws considered to be impractical, when people 
deal across borders more frequently than ever before? 
This Article’s second objective is to investigate why conflicts 
scholarship is considered to be unhelpful at a time of 
unprecedented need. Existing works make the discipline’s decline 
seem simple to reverse, by exaggerating the role of a single cause 
and the efficacy of a single solution. Some attribute the “turmoil 
that . . . besets choice of law” to a neglect of foreign law.47 Others 
blame “abstract arguments . . . couched in pseudo-sophisticated 
jargon[.]”48 I attribute the field’s decline to more fundamental 
problems in what conflicts scholars consider to be important issues 
and how they conduct scholarly inquiry. I submit that unfalsifiable 
argumentation, scholars’ failure to define terms vital to productive 
dialogue, and their obsession with comprehensive, ideal choice of 
law rules at the expense of studying how existing rules actually 
affect individual litigation results have created debates ad nauseam 
 
 44. Cf. id. 
 45. Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 279–80 (1990). 
 46. Julia Halloran McLaughlin, Premarital Agreements and Choice of Law: “One, Two, 
Three, Baby, You and Me,” 72 MO. L. REV. 793, 814 (2007). 
 47. See, e.g., Friedrich K. Juenger, The Need for a Comparative Approach to Choice-of-Law 
Problems, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1309, 1314 (1999); see also Ralf Michaels & Christopher A. Whytock, 
Internationalizing the New Conflict of Laws Restatement, 27 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 349, 358 
(2017) (“The new Conflict of Laws Restatement provides an exciting opportunity to offer 
courts much-needed guidance in conflict of laws in the international context and to benefit 
from comparative analysis.”). 
 48. Earl M. Maltz, Do Modern Theories of Conflict of Laws Work? The New Jersey 
Experience, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 527, 547 (2005). 
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over the exact same ideas,49 jargon that splits hairs,50 and abstruse 
claims that elude seemingly everyone but their fiercest disciples.51 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I elaborates on the legal 
basis and usage of the exploit, shows how this Article fits into 
choice of law and civil procedure literature, and presents a one-
sided incomplete information game to model the exploit. This 
model is akin to the chain-store paradox entry-deterrence game, 
which depicts a chain store taking losses in the short run to drive 
out local stores in the long run.52 Part II advances flashlight 
discovery on the choice of law question pending motions to dismiss 
as a solution to the exploit, and models the consequences of 
implementing it. Part III argues that a misunderstanding of 
practitioners’ needs and undisciplined inquiry have relegated the 
discipline to an academic backwater, and proposes a shift from 
macro-theoretical conflict of laws (designing comprehensive, ideal 
choice of law rules) to micro-applied conflicts (studying how 
existing rules immediately affect individual litigation outcomes).  
I then conclude by discussing the debate over the alleged 
irrelevance of legal scholarship as a whole.  
Although this Article’s immediate subject matter is conflict of 
laws, civil procedure, and torts, I intend its practical benefits to 
reach beyond those fields. The practical need for conflict of laws 
scholarship has arguably never been greater than now, when the 
internet’s omnipresence is making our territorial legal system as it 
exists increasingly unsustainable.53 By helping to cure the 
 
 49. See, e.g., Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of Prescriptive Jurisdiction,  
42 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 47 (2001) (“[I]n choice of law theory, we observe a debate that cycles 
endlessly, regarding whether choice of law by courts should be governed by detailed, 
predictable rules, or, instead, by broad standards, such as balancing tests.”); Larry Kramer, 
Return of the Renvoi, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979, 997 (1991) (“Every argument advanced either for 
or against [renvoi] has turned out to be inconclusive or question-begging. Each step in the 
debate has led us back to the starting point—a veritable circulus inextrabilis.”). 
 50. Cf. Laura E. Little, Hairsplitting and Complexity in Conflict of Laws: The Paradox of 
Formalism, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 925, 926–28 (2004). 
 51. Cf. LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS: FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS, at 
xiii (1991) (acknowledging a “wild-eyed community of intellectual zealots” in conflict of laws 
and that the field’s “reputation as arcane and abstract . . . is well deserved”). 
 52. DAVID DRANOVE, DAVID BESANKO & MARK SHANLEY, ECONOMICS OF STRATEGY  
200 (2017). 
 53. See, e.g., Estelle Shirbon, Press Ban in Tatters as UK Celebrity Threesome Story Spreads 
Online, REUTERS (Apr. 20, 2016), https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-legal/press-ban-
in-tatters-as-uk-celebrity-threesome-story-spreads-online-idUKKCN0XH1WO (describing 
how English residents circumvented a gag order on English tabloids by accessing the banned 
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discipline’s generations-old malaise,54 this Article aims to prod 
conflicts scholarship to leave its echo chamber and to contribute to 
designing a legal system fit to survive the age of cybertorts. 
I. THE MECHANISM AND MATERIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE 
MANISCALCO EXPLOIT 
A. The Legal Basis and Tactical Usage of the Maniscalco Exploit 
The series of cases named Maniscalco v. Brother International 
Corp. arose from an alleged defect in certain printer models sold by 
the defendant (BIC), which is headquartered in New Jersey.55  
The plaintiffs, who purchased the printers at issue in California and 
South Carolina, sued under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act 
(CFA) alleging, inter alia, that BIC knowingly sold “machines that 
they know are likely to fail” due to the defect.56 In 2009, the U.S. 
District Court for the District of New Jersey denied BIC’s motion to 
dismiss the CFA claims, ruling that the claims were sufficiently 
specific.57 For the purpose of considering the motion to dismiss, the 
trial court applied New Jersey law without considering another 
state’s law because BIC argued that the choice of law question is 
“best left for resolution later[,]” and the plaintiffs did not object.58  
However, the plaintiffs’ case fell apart once discovery revealed 
that Brother Industries Limited (BIL), BIC’s parent entity located in 
Japan, had manufactured the printers at issue and printed the 
manuals that should have disclosed the alleged defect.59 Once this 
evidence was revealed, BIC moved successfully to dismiss, arguing 
 
information on Scottish press through the internet); OLGA KIESELMANN, DATA REVOCATION 
ON THE INTERNET, at v (2017) (“[S]ometimes users . . . want to delete their . . . data from the 
Internet. . . . [T]o delete previously published data, the user would need to delete it on a 
foreign server, i.e., where she has absolutely no control.”); Zhongjie Wang, Yue Cao, Zhiyun 
Qian, Chengyu Song & Srikanth V. Krishnamurthy, Your State Is Not Mine: A Closer Look at 
Evading Stateful Internet Censorship, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2017 INTERNET MEASUREMENT 
CONFERENCE 114 (arguing that the INTANG measurement-driven censorship evasion tool 
can circumvent Chinese state censors at “near perfect evasion rates”). 
 54. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. 
 55. Maniscalco v. Brother Int’l Corp. (USA) (Maniscalco II), 627 F. Supp. 2d 494, 497 
(D.N.J. 2009). 
 56. Id. at 500 (emphasis omitted). 
 57. Id. at 506. 
 58. Id. at 499 n.2. 
 59. Maniscalco v. Brother Int’l Corp. (USA) (Maniscalco III), 793 F. Supp. 2d 696,  
707 n.4 (D.N.J. 2011). 
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that New Jersey law does not apply under the most significant 
relationship rule because the failure to disclose any alleged defect 
occurred in Japan.60 The court agreed that New Jersey had fewer 
contacts with the case than did Japan,61 and ruled that the laws of 
the plaintiffs’ home states (South Carolina and California) have the 
most significant relationship to the case because the plaintiffs 
purchased the allegedly defective printers and relied on any 
misrepresentation in those states.62 The Third Circuit affirmed, 
ruling that New Jersey law does not apply because at least some  
of the allegedly tortious conduct “emanated from Japan.”63  
The court also ruled that the law of the appellant’s home state 
(South Carolina) would apply to the case, despite the lack of a 
presumption for applying its law.64  
I argue that BIC could have disposed of Maniscalco during 
pleading, but deliberately protracted the case to discovery in order 
to drain the plaintiffs’ funds on a futile case. BIC knew in November 
2002 that BIL had investigated in Japan the alleged defect at issue 
in Maniscalco.65 Hence, when the plaintiffs sued under New Jersey 
law in 200666 alleging that BIC investigated the defect and 
concealed it,67 BIC could have disposed of the case at the motion to 
dismiss stage by revealing the fact that the alleged tortious conduct 
occurred in Japan. (The court could have considered extrinsic 
evidence at pleading by converting the motion to dismiss into a 
motion for summary judgment68 or by using incorporation by 
reference.69) However, had BIC disposed of the case early,  
 
 60. Id. at 707. 
 61. Id. at 710. 
 62. Id. at 708. 
 63. Maniscalco v. Brother Int’l (USA) Corp. (Maniscalco IV), 709 F.3d 202, 211  
(3d Cir. 2013). 
 64. Following the trial court’s dismissal, only the South Carolina–based plaintiff 
appealed. Id. at 208. 
 65. Maniscalco III, 793 F. Supp. 2d at 699–700. 
 66. Maniscalco v. Brother Int’l Corp. (USA) (Maniscalco I), 2008 WL 2559365 at *1, 
(D.N.J. June 26, 2008). 
 67. Maniscalco IV, 709 F.3d at 206. 
 68. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d); Messer v. V.I. Urb. Renewal Bd., 623 F.2d 303, 307  
(3d Cir. 1980) (“[W]here matters outside the pleadings are considered by the district court, a 
motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted will be treated as a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment.”). 
 69. Usually, courts invoking incorporation by reference consider extrinsic evidence 
pending a motion to dismiss only when certain conditions are met—for example, if the 
1.KIM_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)   3/11/2021  12:54 AM 
343 Conflict of Laws for the Age of Cybertorts 
 343 
 
the plaintiffs may have sued again under a correct state’s law 
because they would now know where the alleged tortious act 
occurred. Instead, BIC asked the court not to consider the choice of 
law issue at pleading70 and moved to dismiss only after discovery 
revealed what it knew already,71 thereby protracting the case for 
two more years until the inevitable dismissal.72 
One may argue that BIC’s failure to disclose the case’s Japanese 
contacts at pleading was not the result of a deliberate attempt to 
protract litigation. Instead, BIC might have involuntarily waited 
until after discovery to move to dismiss for incorrect choice of law, 
because the District Court has ruled in past cases that “it can be 
inappropriate or impossible for a court to conduct [choice of law] 
analysis at the motion to dismiss stage when . . . no discovery has 
taken place.”73 However, this argument fails to answer two 
questions. First, if the court would have waited until discovery to 
decide the choice of law anyway, why did BIC preemptively ask 
the court to delay addressing the issue?74 Second, if BIC did not 
intend to protract the case, why didn’t BIC supply the facts that the 
court needed to decide the choice of law early? In fact, the District 
Court has used extrinsic evidence in the past to dismiss claims, over 
plaintiffs’ objections.75 Moreover, the plaintiffs would likely not 
have objected to BIC introducing extrinsic evidence, because 
 
authenticity of the extrinsic evidence is not disputed and the complaint relies on the extrinsic 
evidence. See Pryor v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002). 
However, federal courts have frequently considered extrinsic evidence pending a motion  
to dismiss even when these conditions do not apply. See, e.g., Calkins v. Dollarland, Inc.,  
117 F. Supp. 2d 421, 429 n.4 (D.N.J. 2000) (considering extrinsic evidence introduced by  
the defendant without converting the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary  
judgment, despite the plaintiff’s opposition); Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076  
(9th Cir. 2005) (considering extrinsic evidence that is neither attached to nor cited by the  
plaintiff’s complaint). 
 70. Maniscalco v. Brother Int’l Corp. (USA) (Maniscalco II), 627 F. Supp. 2d 494, 499 n.2 
(D.N.J. 2009). 
 71. See supra note 12 and accompanying text; Maniscalco v. Brother Int’l Corp. (USA) 
(Maniscalco III), 793 F. Supp. 2d 696, 710 (D.N.J. 2011) (dismissing the suit because  
“New Jersey law does not apply” and the “relevant decisions [regarding the alleged 
wrongful conduct] were not made in New Jersey, but in Japan”). 
 72. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 73. In re Samsung DLP Television Class Action Litig., 2009 WL 3584352, at *3 (D.N.J. 
Oct. 27, 2009); see also Arlandson v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 792 F. Supp. 2d 691, 699–700 
(D.N.J. 2011). 
 74. See Maniscalco II, 627 F. Supp. 2d at 499 n.2. 
 75. See Calkins v. Dollarland, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 421, 429 n.4 (D.N.J. 2000).  
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knowing that the case is connected to Japan would have saved the 
plaintiffs from years of futile litigation. 
However, preventing the victims from suing under the law of 
the state where the tortious act occurred, on its own, does not 
guarantee success with the exploit. To maximize the likelihood that 
the plaintiffs’ case will be dismissed on the choice of law issue, they 
must also be prevented from suing under the law of the states in 
which they suffered the alleged injury. In Maniscalco, the courts 
ruled that the laws of California and South Carolina—where the 
plaintiffs purchased the allegedly defective printers—apply to the 
case, according to the most significant relationship rule.76 Applying 
the law of the state where the injury was suffered is unlikely to be 
an anomaly, as courts facing similar circumstances in other states 
that use the Second Restatement have done the same.77 Courts in 
states that follow the First Restatement have also ruled that the 
place of the wrong is the state where the injury was suffered, not 
the state where the act causing the injury occurred.78 Hence, a 
tortfeasor using the exploit must induce victims to sue under the 
law of a state where neither the tortious act nor the injury occurred. 
Notably, the Maniscalco plaintiffs sued in New Jersey, which has 
“one of the strongest consumer protection laws in the nation.”79 
Of course, not all tortfeasors may find the exploit useful. Unlike 
many corporations, which cannot act completely anonymously 
because they need to market their goods and services under their 
own brands, individual tortfeasors who act alone over the internet 
can be difficult to catch.80 Because they may not be brought to trial 
to begin with, such lone wolves may not need to use the exploit. 
 
 76. See Maniscalco III, 793 F. Supp. 2d at 708; Maniscalco v. Brother Int’l (USA) Corp. 
(Maniscalco IV), 709 F.3d 202, 208–9 (3d Cir. 2013).  
 77. See Pa. Emp., Benefit Tr. Fund v. Zeneca, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 2d 458, 475  
(D. Del. 2010) (applying New York law because New York is “the forum where he relied on 
Defendants’ alleged misrepresentations”). 
 78. See, e.g., Bullard v. MRA Holding, LLC, 740 S.E.2d 622 (Ga. 2013) (ruling that the 
place of the wrong under lex loci delicti is the state in which injury is felt, not the state in 
which the conduct causing the injury occurred). 
 79. See Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 647 A.2d 454, 460 (N.J. 1994) (citing Governor’s 
Press Release for Assembly Bill No. 2402, at 1 (Apr. 19, 1971)). 
 80. See, e.g., Marcus Chung, A New Wave of Ransomware Is Coming This Fall (and You’re 
Probably Not Prepared), 20 J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 37, 37 (2018) (“[O]ne of the easiest 
assaults on a computer system is ransomware—a debilitating attack through which an 
anonymous criminal encrypts your files and then forces you to pay them whatever amount 
they request in order to regain access to your system . . . .”). 
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Even if the tortfeasor is a corporation who cannot act anonymously, 
the exploit would also be unhelpful if its cost exceeds its revenue. 
For example, if a tort returns $30,000 in gains but it would cost 
$50,000 to protract a futile trial to discovery, the exploit would seem 
to be not worth its cost. However, this cost-benefit calculation does 
not account for the exploit’s long-term gains. Assume that the 
tortfeasor commits ten torts that each returns $30,000, and that the 
tortfeasor goes to trial and uses the exploit for a total of four times, 
each at a cost of $50,000. If the plaintiff stops suing with the fifth 
tort because the previous losses have built an expectation that she 
will lose at trial, the tortfeasor would make an overall profit of 
$100,000 despite initial losses. Section I.C.3 describes in detail how 
a tortfeasor may take short-term losses for greater long-term gains. 
Moreover, although corporate tortfeasors can still use the 
Maniscalco exploit even if none of the material acts occur over the 
internet, the rising volume of cross-border transactions made over 
the internet81 promises to make the exploit both easier to use and 
more effective.82 Since long before the internet existed, companies, 
unlike individuals, have maintained a presence in many states 
simultaneously.83 Even in Maniscalco, none of BIL’s allegedly 
tortious conduct took place over the internet; the plaintiffs sued 
under New Jersey law because they apparently did not know that 
the tortious act occurred in Japan.84 However, the fact remains that 
the internet makes it easier to commit torts over state borders85 and 
to disguise one’s actual location.86 Although the widely available 
 
 81. See Sindbæk, supra note 5. 
 82. Although this Article focuses on the use of the Maniscalco exploit in litigation 
arising from torts, it could also be used in cases arising from contracts because corporations 
could deceive plaintiffs as to which state has the most significant relationship to a contract. 
Of course, I am not claiming that the exploit can be used in all cases arising from torts and 
contracts. In product liability suits, for example, it would be difficult to misrepresent the state 
with genuine contacts to a case because plaintiffs would sue in the state where the product 
at issue was manufactured. 
 83. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (establishing personal 
jurisdiction in Washington against a Delaware corporation whose principal place of business 
was in Missouri). 
 84. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. The Maniscalco II plaintiffs could not 
have won on the choice of law issue because they were not New Jersey residents and, 
therefore, the effect of their injury was not felt in New Jersey. 
 85. See Beall, supra note 36. 
 86. Charles A. Weiss, Note, Available to All, Produced by Few: The Economic and  
Cultural Impact of Europe’s Digital Single Market Strategy Within the Audiovisual Industry,  
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means to conceal one’s location while acting via the internet are not 
foolproof,87 I submit that they need not be foolproof for the exploit 
to work, given that attorneys88 and the public89 that they represent 
in court tend to be unfamiliar or inept with cybersecurity practices. 
One may argue that BIC could have evaded liability in 
Maniscalco without using the exploit because an act material to the 
plaintiffs’ alleged injuries—the “failure to disclose latent defects” 
in the printers at issue90—was committed by BIC’s parent entity, 
not by BIC. However, neither the district court nor the Third Circuit 
ever states that Brother could have gotten the case thrown out by 
invoking the corporate veil. Moreover, the rule that “a subsidiary 
is not liable for acts of its parent” does not hold if the veil is 
pierced.91 Because the corporate veil is not always available and can 
only be pierced if one legal entity is the alter ego of another in the 
commission of a tort,92 the argument that the Maniscalco exploit can 
be a useful tool for corporate tortfeasors still stands. Moreover, the 
rule that one cannot invoke the tortious acts of a subsidiary to 
obtain personal jurisdiction against a parent entity without 
 
2016 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 877, 897–98 (2016) (describing how users of virtual private 
networks “can disguise their location with [a proxy] in a different territory”). 
 87. See Kaminski, supra note 37. 
 88. See, e.g., Cheryl B. Preston, Lawyers’ Abuse of Technology, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 879, 
922 (2018) (stating that law firms are “woefully unprepared” for cyberattacks) (quoting 
Victor Li, How Prepared Are Law Firms for Cyber Breaches? And How Often Are Firms Being 
Attacked?, A.B.A. J. (June 29, 2017, 8:41 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article 
/how_prepared_are_law_firms_for_cyber_breaches_and_how_often_are_they_being_ 
[https://perma.cc/8RM9-BEAE]; Gerald O’Hara, Cyber-Espionage: A Growing Threat to the 
American Economy, 19 COMM. LAW CONSPECTUS 241, 243 (2010) (“Private firms are often 
unaware of data breaches, sometimes discovering cyber attacks only after they have been 
ongoing for months or even years.”). 
 89. See, e.g., Aaron Smith, What the Public Knows About Cybersecurity, PEW RSCH. CTR. 
(Mar. 22, 2017), http://www.pewinternet.org/2017/03/22/what-the-public-knows-about-
cybersecurity/ (“Of the 13 questions [about cybersecurity] in the survey, a substantial 
majority of online adults were able to correctly answer just two of them.”); Lawrence J. 
Trautman, Cybersecurity: What About U.S. Policy?, 2015 U. ILL. J.L., TECH. & POL’Y 341, 349–50 
(2015) (“[T]echnical issues surrounding cybersecurity are not widely understood by the 
general public.”). 
 90. Maniscalco v. Brother Int’l (USA) Corp. (Maniscalco IV), 709 F.3d 202, 211  
(3d Cir. 2013). 
 91. See, e.g., Phonometrics, Inc. v. Resinter N. Am. Corp., No. 97-1101, 1997 WL 580519, 
at *1 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 17, 1997) (“[A] subsidiary is not liable for acts of its parent, and vice 
versa (absent some piercing of the corporate veil).”). 
 92. See, e.g., United States v. Jon-T Chemicals, Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 691 (5th Cir. 1985). 
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sufficient contacts to the alleged tort93 does not apply to Maniscalco 
because, in that case, the parent did have genuine contacts. 
Finally, a qualification is in order about the significance of the 
Maniscalco exploit in the tactical considerations made by corporate 
tortfeasors and their victims. The fact that this Article focuses on 
the exploit should not be taken to mean that it is the only factor that 
affects corporate tortfeasors’ decision to misrepresent the origin of 
a tort as a certain state, or the victims’ decision to sue under the 
laws of a particular state. Whether a borrowing statute affects the 
statute of limitations94 or even whether counsel has an office in a 
state may affect the parties’ decisions. This Article simply argues 
that the exploit is a significant factor that would affect the parties’ 
tactical calculus and that existing scholarship fails to address it. 
Section I.A having established the legal basis of the Maniscalco 
exploit, Section I.B discusses how this work fits into conflicts and 
civil procedure literature. Section I.C models the consequences  
of the Maniscalco exploit using entry deterrence games under  
one-sided incomplete information. 
B. The Scholarly Significance of the Maniscalco Exploit                          
in Conflict of Laws and Civil Procedure 
To my knowledge, no work in conflict of laws or civil procedure 
studies the Maniscalco exploit. I submit that conflicts literature 
overlooks the Maniscalco exploit because conflict of laws scholars 
tend to focus on designing theoretically ideal choice of law rules, 
but the exploit is about how a defect in an existing choice of law 
rule immediately affects litigation outcomes. The history of 
American conflict of laws is scholars vying to replace the prevailing 
choice of law rule with their idea of a theoretically superior 
alternative. The First Restatement’s lex loci rule, once dominant, 
was overthrown by scholars and judges in the so-called choice of 
law revolution of the 1960s.95 Since then, the discipline has seen 
 
 93. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014); see also Lea Brilmayer & Kathleen 
Paisley, Personal Jurisdiction and Substantive Legal Relations: Corporations, Conspiracies, and 
Agency, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1986). 
 94. See, e.g., Miller v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 581 P.2d 345, 348 (Idaho 1978) (“Borrowing 
statutes change the common law rule governing choice of the applicable statute  
of limitation.”). 
 95. See Symeon C. Symeonides, The Choice-of-Law Revolution Fifty Years After Currie:  
An End and a Beginning, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1847, 1868 (2015). 
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repeated proposals and takedowns of the same few choice of law 
rules such as interest analysis, comparative impairment, and the 
better rule of law.96 The debate over interest analysis remains 
especially memorable, both for its longevity97 and the acrimonious 
tone taken by some interlocutors, rare even for legal academia.98 
Amid such heightened passions for ideal choice of law rules, 
scholars have neglected the value of studying how litigants and 
judges interact with existing choice of law rules. For example, 
conventional conflicts scholarship does not study how uncertainty 
over the facts of a case affects courts’ choice of law. A “classic choice 
of law problem[]” asks, “[I]f two friends from Maine get into a car 
accident . . . in Chad, which law governs whether the passenger can 
sue the driver for negligence?”99 Scholars of classic choice of law 
problems tend to assume that two Mainers really did get into a car 
accident in Chad, and argue over which state’s law should apply to 
that case.100 In contrast, this Article is uninterested in whether it 
would be just to apply New Jersey law to Maniscalco. Instead, it 
 
 96. See, e.g., Gene R. Shreve, Currie’s Governmental Interest Analysis—Has It Become a 
Paper Tiger?, 46 OHIO STATE L.J. 541, 542 (1985) (“Today, Currie’s governmental interest 
analysis is scarcely more than a paper tiger.”); Kermit Roosevelt III, The Myth of Choice of Law: 
Rethinking Conflicts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2448, 2466 (1999) (“Interest analysis is the leading 
scholarly position, and the only doctrine that could plausibly claim to have generated a 
school of adherents.”); Joseph William Singer, Real Conflicts, 69 B.U. L. REV. 1, 77 (1989) 
(arguing that the Second Restatement “mystifies rather than clarifies”); William F. Baxter, 
Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 19 (1963) (advancing the comparative 
impairment approach); William H. Allen & Erin A. O’Hara, Second Generation Law and 
Economics of Conflict of Laws: Baxter’s Comparative Impairment and Beyond, 51 STAN. L. REV. 
1011, 1035–36 (1999) (criticizing the comparative impairment approach); Robert A. Leflar, 
Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1584, 1586–88 (1966) 
(advancing the “better rule of law” approach); Note, Bundled Systems and Better Law: Against 
the Leflar Method of Resolving Conflicts of Law, 129 HARV. L. REV. 544 (2015). 
 97. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, What I Like Most About the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts, 
and Why It Should Not Be Thrown Out with the Bathwater, 110 AJIL UNBOUND 144, 144 (2016) 
(“This symposium’s essay by . . . Kermit Roosevelt III[] seems to retain what may be the least 
defensible aspects of governmental interest analysis . . . .”). 
 98. See, e.g., Bruce Posnak, Choice of Law—Interest Analysis: They Still Don’t Get It, 40 
WAYNE L. REV. 1121, 1131 (1994) (“[Professor Brilmayer] refuse[s] to ‘get it’ and abuse[s] 
Currie’s ideas, [and] she has spawned a whole school of misinformed fry-critics. . . . [T]hey 
have . . . infected both courts and practicing lawyers . . . .” (footnotes omitted)). 
 99. Perry Dane, The Maps of Sovereignty: A Meditation, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 959,  
978 (1991). 
 100. See, e.g., H. Thomas Byron III, Comment, A Conflict of Laws Model for Foreign Branch 
Deposit Cases, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 671–72 (1991) (describing foreign bank deposit cases as 
a “classic conflict of laws problem” and arguing that “courts should resolve this problem . . . 
by explicitly . . . balancing the interests of the affected jurisdictions”). 
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points out that in actual litigation—unlike in classic choice of law 
problems—there can be uncertainty over whether the wrongful act 
occurred in New Jersey at all, and that defendants may abuse that 
uncertainty to evade liability. Put differently, if classic choice of law 
debates the philosophical reasons for whether one should drive on 
the left or right side of the road, this Article simply shows that 
driving on the right is correlated to more accidents.101 
To my knowledge, the work to come closest to discussing the 
exploit is an endnote in a casebook by Brilmayer, Goldsmith, and 
O’Hara O’Connor. The difference is that the endnote presents 
uncertainty over the facts of a case during pleading as an unfair 
advantage for plaintiffs, whereas this Article argues that the 
uncertainty benefits tortfeasors. The endnote discusses a case in 
which LCD panel manufacturers had allegedly fixed prices in 
violation of California law. The district court dismissed, ruling that 
only “plaintiffs who purchased products in California” may invoke 
California law,102 but the plaintiffs did not plausibly allege that the 
purchases at issue had occurred in California.103 The Ninth Circuit 
reversed, ruling that the plaintiffs’ allegations that the defendants 
had committed wrongful acts in California were enough to apply 
California law at pleading: “Wherever the outer limit of due 
process constraints may lie . . . [the] Defendants’ alleged illegal 
activity within California created more significant contacts with 
California than the contacts described in Allstate created with 
Minnesota.”104 The endnote in the casebook then asks: 
Doesn’t the Ninth Circuit’s ruling allow plaintiffs to unfairly 
control the choice of law, simply by making allegations of contact 
with the forum? The proper standard of proof for such 
allegations, made at the outset of the case and before the trier of 
the fact has evaluated the evidence, has been the subject of some 
dispute. Under the Supreme Court’s current standard, a plaintiff 
must have “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible 
on its face” to survive a 12(b)(6) motion for dismissal. Bell Atlantic 
 
 101. See J.J. LEEMING, ROAD ACCIDENTS: PREVENT OR PUNISH? 26 (1969). 
 102. In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., Nos. M 07-1827, C 09-4997 SI., 2010 WL 
4705518, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2010), rev’d sub nom. AT&T Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics 
Corp., 707 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 103. In re TFT-LCD Antitrust Litig., 2010 WL 4705518, at *1. 
 104. AU Optronics, 707 F.3d at 1111. 
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Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007). Does Allstate v. Hague 
meet this standard?105 
AU Optronics indeed shows that plaintiffs can obtain favorable 
choice of law rulings by falsely asserting contacts.106 However, the 
endnote’s implied concern that the ruling unfairly benefits 
plaintiffs, or that plaintiffs might sue under the laws of unrelated 
states en masse, is unjustified. Plaintiffs are unlikely to falsely assert 
contacts because, even if they can trick a court into applying a 
favorable state’s law and denying a motion to dismiss, their scheme 
would be exposed at discovery. The exception that proves this rule 
is Hatfill v. Foster, in which the plaintiff falsely asserted contacts 
with Virginia for a favorable choice of law ruling but was exposed 
during further proceedings.107 Even if the court does not expose the 
plaintiffs sua sponte, the defendants are likely to do so because they 
often know more about how the plaintiffs were harmed than the 
plaintiffs do.108 Indeed, plaintiffs’ ability to control the choice of law 
by alleging contacts with a state is more likely to harm the plaintiffs 
themselves; as this Article shows, the Maniscalco exploit enables 
tortfeasors to evade liability by inducing plaintiffs to sue under the 
law of a state where they cannot win. 
Unlike most conflict of laws scholars, many civil procedure 
scholars have studied a problem that, like the Maniscalco exploit, 
arises from an information asymmetry between plaintiffs and 
tortfeasors.109 However, the paradox of pleading in civil procedure 
 
 105. LEA BRILMAYER, JACK GOLDSMITH & ERIN O’HARA O’CONNOR, CONFLICT OF LAWS: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 326 (7th ed. 2015). 
 106. No public proceeding in the Ninth Circuit or in the district court ever revealed 
whether the original plaintiffs in the AU Optronics case, AT&T and its subsidiaries, had 
falsely alleged contacts with California at the pleading stage; the original plaintiffs 
apparently settled shortly after the Ninth Circuit’s ruling. See Pan Chih-yi & Ann Chen, AUO 
Says Price-Fixing Lawsuit Fully Settled with AT&T, FOCUS TAIWAN (Feb. 18, 2013, 5:04 PM), 
http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aeco/201302180021.aspx. All known proceedings following 
the Ninth Circuit’s ruling involved state governments and indirect purchaser plaintiffs of 
LCD panels such as Best Buy, who settled their claims in 2016. See In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) 
Antitrust Litig., No. 07-md-01827-SI, 2017 WL 66836, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2017). 
 107. Hatfill v. Foster (Hatfill I), 372 F. Supp. 2d 725 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), rev’d on 
reconsideration, Hatfill v. Foster (Hatfill III), 415 F. Supp. 2d 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (applying 
Virginia law at pleading); Hatfill III, 415 F. Supp. 2d at 359–60 (reversing because “[the] 
plaintiff and his lawyers pulled a fast one on the Court”). 
 108. See, e.g., Kilaru, supra note 39. 
 109. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 20 (2010) (arguing that plausibility pleading is 
“fact pleading by another name”). 
1.KIM_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)   3/11/2021  12:54 AM 
351 Conflict of Laws for the Age of Cybertorts 
 351 
 
and the Maniscalco exploit are caused by different kinds of 
information asymmetry, and the exploit is likely to be more 
damaging to its victims. The paradox of pleading refers to the 
tendency of tort victims to know less about how they were harmed 
than do the people who harmed them.110 For instance, someone 
who suspects wrongful termination might not sue if the reason for 
the dismissal “is revealed only in documents that the plaintiff has 
not seen” and are held by the employer, because the complaint 
would not survive a motion to dismiss.111 Like victims of the 
paradox of pleading, victims of the exploit lack information held by 
tortfeasors that they need to win. The difference is that victims of 
the paradox know so little about who harmed them, and how, that 
they cannot survive pleading, but victims of the exploit know 
enough to survive a motion to dismiss but not enough to win. 
This difference is not a mere technicality, because the difference 
makes the Maniscalco exploit potentially more harmful than the 
paradox of pleading is. The paradox harms plaintiffs by deterring 
them from suing or, if they sue despite the deterrence, by getting 
their claims dismissed at pleading for insufficient plausibility.  
The harm to the plaintiffs who do not sue would be not being paid 
damages, whereas the additional harm to those who sue and lose 
would be the cost of litigating until dismissal at pleading.112  
In contrast to the paradox, the Maniscalco exploit harms plaintiffs 
by inducing them to bring cases that will survive pleading, but 
under the law of a state where those cases will be dismissed after 
discovery for incorrect choice of law. The harm to the victims of the 
exploit would include not being paid damages and the cost of 
litigating a case into discovery. Because litigating a case into 
discovery usually costs much more than litigating into dismissal 
during pleading,113 the exploit is likely to be much more harmful 
than the paradox is. 
 
 110. See, e.g., Kilaru, supra note 39. 
 111. A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1, 28 (2009). 
 112. See Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 879 (2010) (“[S]trict pleading will screen some 
meritorious suits, even ones with a high probability of trial success but a probability that is 
not evident at the pleading stage before access to discovery.”). 
 113. See UNITED STATES COURTS, TABLE C-5—U.S. DISTRICT COURTS—CIVIL STATISTICAL 
TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (June 30, 2018), available at https://www.uscourts.gov/ 
statistics/table/c-5/statistical-tables-federal-judiciary/2018/06/30 (showing that the 
median time from filing to disposition of a federal civil case during or after pretrial 
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Moreover, like the scholarship on the paradox of pleading, 
studies on the various ways to introduce evidence at the motion to 
dismiss stage neglect the Maniscalco exploit. The exploit can induce 
plaintiffs to sue under the law of a state where they are guaranteed 
to lose and litigate that futile case into discovery because, at the 
time they sue, the plaintiffs have bad information about where the 
act that harmed them occurred. Hence, a solution to the Maniscalco 
exploit would be to introduce evidence about where an alleged 
tortious act occurred at the motion to dismiss stage so that plaintiffs 
tricked by tortfeasors can cut their losses early and sue under the 
law of a state that has genuine contacts to the case. However, to my 
knowledge, existing works bill access to evidence at the motion to 
dismiss stage as a solution to the paradox of pleading, not to the 
Maniscalco exploit.114 In Part II, I propose flashlight discovery 
limited to the choice of law issue as a solution to the exploit and 
model how various conditions would affect its implementation. 
Finally, this Article identifies a tactical consideration that 
tortfeasors would make in the course of deceiving courts, which 
existing works neglect. Recall that, at pleading, tortfeasors like BIC 
must make two claims: that they did not commit the tort they are 
accused of, and that any tortious act, if it did occur, would have 
taken place in a state that lacks genuine contacts with the alleged 
tort. These claims could raise suspicions that the tortfeasor did 
commit the tort and is trying to hide the state with the most 
significant relationship to the tort, akin to how someone accused of 
murder might be viewed with suspicion if they claimed that they 
did not kill anyone but, if they did, they must have been drunk. The 
fact that tortfeasors must deny wrongful conduct while pointing 
plaintiffs to a dummy state suggests that tortfeasors’ legal 
 
proceedings is 13.1 months); Raúl Rojas, Offer of Judgment Rules in Puerto Rico and Florida,  
49 REV. DER P.R. 1, 11 (2009) (“From filing to discovery [it] is common to have a couple of 
years pass by.”). 
 114. See, e.g., Jill Curry & Matthew Ward, Are Twombly and Iqbal Affecting Where 
Plaintiffs File? A Study Comparing Removal Rates by State, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 827, 836 (2013) 
(“[P]laintiffs cannot state a claim because they do not have access to discovery, but they will 
not have access to discovery until they state a claim.”). See generally Suzette M. Malveaux, 
Front Loading and Heavy Lifting: How Pre-Dismissal Discovery Can Address the Detrimental Effect 
of Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 65 (2010) (arguing that courts  
should permit limited discovery at the beginning of litigation because Twombly and  
Iqbal’s plausibility pleading standard makes it more difficult for civil rights litigation to 
survive dismissal). 
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arguments must strike a fine balance so as to deceive plaintiffs 
while avoiding punishment for openly deceiving the court. 
Section I.B having established the position of the Maniscalco 
exploit within conflict of laws and civil procedure literature and 
having justified its study, Section I.C models the effects of the 
exploit on litigation, using entry deterrence games under one-sided 
incomplete information. 
C. An Entry-Deterrence Model of Interstate Torts with the Maniscalco 
Exploit, Under One-Sided Incomplete Information 
This Section adapts the chain-store paradox, which models a 
chain store selling goods at a loss in the short run to muscle out 
local stores in the long run,115 to model a corporate tortfeasor 
financing futile litigation in the short run to prevent plaintiffs from 
suing it in the long run. The model used in this Article is different 
from the chain-store paradox, in that the uncertainty at play is 
whether the plaintiff is suing under the law of a dummy state; in 
the chain-store paradox, the uncertainty at play is the strength of 
the chain store’s resolve to put competitors out of business. The two 
models are similar in that they both simulate a process of entry 
deterrence, and that the stronger player may willingly take losses 
in the short run for greater gains in the long run. 
I use a formal model to study the Maniscalco exploit for two 
reasons. First, the exploit is likely to be unobservable in the long 
run. Section I.A explained that, if tortfeasors use the exploit 
sufficiently often in the short run to evade paying damages to 
plaintiffs, tortfeasors may profit from the exploit in the long run 
without actually using it, because the expectation that tortfeasors 
will win by draining the plaintiffs’ funds would deter plaintiffs 
from suing. If a credible threat to use the exploit is enough to make 
the exploit profitable, an empirical study of only observed instances 
of the exploit would understate the true magnitude of its effect on 
the litigation process. 
Second, formal models grounded in defensible assumptions 
about reality can concisely simulate complex strategic behavior and 
reveal valuable insights into its consequences.116 I find clarity and 
 
 115. See DRANOVE, BESANKO & SHANLEY, supra note 52. 
 116. See Lea Brilmayer & Yunsieg P. Kim, Model or Muddle? Quantitative Modeling and 
the Façade of “Modernization” in Law, 56 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 19 (2017) (criticizing formal models 
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conciseness to be especially important to a discussion on the 
consequences of choice of law rules, because unfalsifiable 
argumentation and disagreements over vital terminology have 
caused decades of futile debate over which choice of law rule is 
theoretically superior to another; Part III discusses this persistent 
malady in detail and advances formal modeling as an aid for logical 
argumentation in conflicts scholarship. To show how formal 
models can serve in that capacity, Section I.C models civil litigation 
as a sequential game in which a tortfeasor and a plaintiff act in 
turn—commit a tort, respond by filing a complaint, and so on—
seeking to maximize payoffs.117 
I model the Maniscalco exploit using a finite repeated game in 
which one tortfeasor faces multiple plaintiffs, one plaintiff in each 
round. Section I.C.1 uses Bayesian updating to explain how the 
plaintiff in the first round of the repeated game falls victim to the 
exploit and how plaintiffs in subsequent rounds gradually come to 
expect the tortfeasor to use the exploit. Section I.C.2 uses an 
extended game tree to model the behavior of the tortfeasor and the 
nth plaintiff (𝒏 > 𝟏, 𝒏 ∈ ℕ), to derive the conditions under which 
the tortfeasor would use the exploit and those under which the 
plaintiff would go to trial, settle, or give up on suing the tortfeasor. 
Section I.C.3 depicts the rth round (𝒓 > 𝒏, 𝒓 ∈ ℕ) and briefly 
returns to the nth to show that the tortfeasor has an incentive to use 
the exploit at a loss in the short run, because the long-term gains 
may offset them. That is, if the tortfeasor has used the exploit often 
enough by the nth round that the rth plaintiff expects to lose at trial, 
the tortfeasor could profit thereafter without having to pay the cost 
of the exploit (protracting trials) because plaintiffs beginning with 
the rth would not sue the tortfeasor. 
1. The ME model: Bayesian updating in the early rounds of the game 
Players. The ME model features two categories of players: a 
corporate tortfeasor present in multiple states and individual 
 
grounded in indefensible assumptions about reality); JAMES D. MORROW, GAME THEORY FOR 
POLITICAL SCIENTISTS 1 (1994) (“Game theory . . . can tell us what behavior we should expect 
as a consequence of [formal models].”). 
 117. Cf. Jeffrey S. Banks & Joel Sobel, Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games,  
55 ECONOMETRICA 647, 649 (1987); Robert J. Rhee, The Effect of Risk on Legal Valuation,  
78 U. COLO. L. REV. 193, 214–15 (2007) (modeling civil litigation as a sequential game). 
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plaintiffs located in states different from that of the tortfeasor.118 
The repeated game assumes that one tortfeasor faces one plaintiff 
in each round for a finite number of rounds, for simplicity. In 
reality, tortfeasors may be simultaneously engaged in multiple 
trials in which the Maniscalco exploit is used. However, regardless 
of the number of tortfeasors and plaintiffs who face each other 
simultaneously, the fact remains that there exists a point in time t 
in which no plaintiff has ever seen the exploit, and a point 𝒕 + 𝟏 in 
which a plaintiff observes the exploit for the first time. As long as 
points 𝒕 and 𝒕 + 𝟏 exist, the number of litigants in a single round 
does not affect the model’s conclusions, as will be shown shortly. 
Incomplete information in the first round. Section I.A explained 
that, in order to use the Maniscalco exploit, the tortfeasor would 
first misrepresent the origin of a tort as a state that has no genuine 
contacts with that tort. At the beginning of the first round, when 
the exploit has never yet been observed at any trial, the plaintiff 
does not suspect either this misrepresentation or that she has no 
chance to win at trial because of that misrepresentation.  
To understand why the first-round plaintiff does not suspect the 
tortfeasor’s misrepresentation, consider the following process 
through which she assesses the tortfeasor’s and her own likelihood 
of winning at trial. This Bayesian updating process is crucial not 
only to understanding how the first-round plaintiff forms her 
mistaken beliefs, but also to understanding how plaintiffs  
(or plaintiffs’ counsel) in subsequent rounds of the repeated game 
change their beliefs about their own chances of winning. 
Assume that the tortfeasor harms the first-round plaintiff and 
misrepresents the state with genuine contacts to the tort.  
As explained previously, the plaintiff believes that she has a good 
chance to win on the merits because she knows exactly how she was 
harmed; the only mistaken bit of information she has is about the 
state where the tort originated.119 Because the first-round plaintiff 
believes that she has a strong case on the merits, the only remaining 
factor in her assessment of her chances of winning at trial is how 
much the legal system inherently advantages tortfeasors. Figure 1 
 
 118. Again, the assumption is that the tortfeasor has successfully induced its victims to 
sue in a dummy state, which has no genuine contacts to the victims’ injury because: (1) the 
tort did not originate from the dummy state, and (2) the victims do not reside there, meaning 
that the injury is not felt there. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 119. See supra notes 26–29, 76–79, and accompanying text. 
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shows the three possible states of the world from the plaintiff’s 
perspective, ordered from low to high advantage for tortfeasors: 
optimal, suboptimal, and broken. 
The first-round plaintiff inevitably falls for the Maniscalco 
exploit because she seriously contemplates the optimal and 
suboptimal worlds, but not the broken. In the optimal world, the 
legal system operates as it would ideally: no one commits torts 
because tortfeasors would always lose at trial and pay more in costs 
and damages than they would gain from them. The first plaintiff 
deduces that she is not in the optimal world because she has 
already been harmed. As for the broken world, in which the legal 
system favors tortfeasors so much that they always win, the 
plaintiff does not consider it because she has never seen the exploit 
before. A plaintiff may consider the broken world as a theoretical 
exercise, but never seriously: one could exit the top floor of a 
skyscraper through the elevator or the window, but no non-suicidal 
person would entertain the second option.120 However, the first 
plaintiff is actually in the broken world because the exploit and the 
tortfeasor’s misrepresentation guarantee that she will lose at trial. 
 
Figure 1: Three Possible States of the World,  
First-Round Plaintiff’s Perspective 
Type Characteristics 
Optimal 
No one ever commits torts because tortfeasors 
would always lose 
Suboptimal 
Corporate tortfeasors sometimes win, due to the 
corporate-individual asymmetry in funds and 
legal representation 
Broken 
Tortfeasors practically always win, by using the 
Maniscalco exploit 
 
In the only remaining state of the world (suboptimal), injured 
plaintiffs win sometimes, but not always. Although injured 
plaintiffs would always win in an ideal world, plaintiffs in the 
 
 120. See John Mueller, The Obsolescence of Major War, in THE USE OF FORCE: MILITARY 
POWER AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 427, 436 (Robert J. Art & Kenneth N. Waltz eds., 1999) 
(“Consider a man who is on the fifth floor of a building and is musing over two methods for 
reaching the ground floor: walking down the stairs (slow) or jumping out the window 
(fast). . . . [T]he decision is not a terribly difficult one to be ‘rational’ about.”). 
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suboptimal world do not because their funds and attorneys are 
outmatched by those of corporate tortfeasors. However, plaintiffs 
are not entirely without hope because the substance of the law still 
favors them over those who injured them. Because the tortfeasor 
has injured the plaintiff and she does not think that the broken 
world is possible, the first-round plaintiff believes that the world is 
suboptimal, and that she has a chance to win. Her mistaken belief 
is strengthened by the fact that the suboptimal and broken worlds 
are outwardly indistinguishable from one another: in both worlds, 
corporations would often be better funded than individual 
plaintiffs would.121 Because of her mistaken belief that the world is 
suboptimal, the first-round plaintiff sues, observes the Maniscalco 
exploit at trial, and spends years’ worth of resources only to lose. 
Bayesian updating after the first round. I have shown so far that 
the first-round plaintiff in the ME model loses at trial because she 
has never seen the Maniscalco exploit before and hence does not 
expect it. However, although keeping the exploit secret from 
plaintiffs virtually ensures that tortfeasors will win at trial, 
tortfeasors actually have an incentive to make the exploit known to 
as many plaintiffs as possible. If plaintiffs expect to face the exploit 
at trial, they may not sue at all because they expect to lose, allowing 
tortfeasors to reap the benefits from harming plaintiffs without 
expending the cost of using the exploit (the cost of protracting a 
futile case for years). Plaintiffs also have an incentive to anticipate 
whether the tortfeasor will use the exploit at trial, even if they 
cannot defeat it: if a tortfeasor will use the exploit, the plaintiff 
would be better off by anticipating it and giving up on suing, than 
by remaining ignorant of it and going to trial. 
By the nth round (𝒏 > 𝟏, 𝒏 ∈ ℕ), the plaintiff expects the 
tortfeasor to use the Maniscalco exploit because the tortfeasor 
forces a critical mass of plaintiffs to waste money on futile cases in 
rounds 1 to 𝒏 − 𝟏, such that the nth plaintiff knows that the 
previous plaintiffs lost because of the exploit. I do not assume that 
the plaintiffs acquire this information directly from one another. 
Instead, I assume that the plaintiffs are represented by the same 
 
 121. Cf. Angela Gilmore, Self-Inflicted Wounds: The Duty to Disclose Damaging Legal 
Authority, 43 CLEV. STATE L. REV. 303, 316 (1995) (“Cases are filed every[]day in which the 
plaintiff is an individual of average means, while the defendant corporation, for example, 
comes laden with deep pockets, easily able to pay far more for legal representation than  
the plaintiff.”). 
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group of local attorneys, and that they advise their clients against 
suing after seeing enough cases in which the exploit is used.122 The 
common practice of plaintiffs’ attorneys paying clients’ litigation 
costs upfront123 would make the exploit’s deterrent effect even 
stronger than if plaintiffs financed their own litigation: the chances 
of an attorney financing cases that she deems to be futile are likely 
even lower than the chances of a plaintiff taking a futile case to trial 
against counsel’s advice.124 
Now consider the Bayesian updating process through which 
the nth-round plaintiff comes to expect tortfeasors to use the 
exploit. Denote a plaintiff’s perceived likelihood that a tortfeasor 
will use the Maniscalco exploit as x; the first plaintiff’s perceived 
likelihood that the exploit will be used is zero (𝒙𝟏 = 𝟎) because she 
has never seen it before. However, as more plaintiffs suffer through 
futile lawsuits, successive plaintiffs suspect more strongly that the 
world is “broken”—that the litigation process may be rigged 
against them. Assume that the second plaintiff believes that there 
is a ten-percent chance that the world is broken (𝒙𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟏), after 
seeing the first-round plaintiff lose because of the exploit. Further 
assume that a plaintiff’s perceived likelihood of winning at trial 
solely on the merits (the likelihood of winning at trial if the exploit 
were not used) is eighty percent (𝒒 = 𝟎. 𝟖). After seeing the second 
plaintiff lose at trial, the third plaintiff updates her perception of 
the likelihood that the world is broken according to Bayes’ Rule125:  
 
 
 122. See, e.g., Joanna C. Schwartz, What Police Learn from Lawsuits, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 
841, 868 (2012) (“[A] plaintiff may have trouble finding an attorney to take her case if . . . 
there is a small likelihood of prevailing.”). 
 123. See Cara Van Dorn, When Joining Means Enforcing: Giving Consumer Protection 
Agencies Authority to Ban the Use of Class Action Waivers, 17 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. 
PROP. L. 245, 258–59 (2017) (“Plaintiffs’ attorneys typically work on a contingency fee basis, 
which means that the attorney pays for the costs of litigation upfront and only receives 
payment from the client if the case succeeds, as a percentage of the damages.”). 
 124. Cf. Moua v. Pittullo, Howington, Barker, Abernathy, LLP, 174 Cal. Rptr. 3d 662 
(Cal. App. 2014) (a case in which a plaintiff rejected a settlement offer against counsel’s 
advice only to receive nothing from a jury); William H.J. Hubbard, A Fresh Look at Plausibility 
Pleading, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 693, 735 (2016) (“Plaintiffs’ attorneys will screen cases for 
plausible merit . . . .”). 
 125. See WILLIAM M. BOLSTAD & JAMES M. CURRAN, INTRODUCTION TO BAYESIAN 
STATISTICS 67–69 (3d ed. 2017). 
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The third plaintiff’s perception of the likelihood that the world 
is broken has increased by more than twenty-five percent, 
compared to the second plaintiff’s perception. 
2. The ME model: The repeated game, nth round 
Section I.C.1 showed that the first-round plaintiff in the ME 
model falls for the Maniscalco exploit because she does not expect 
it, but that each successive plaintiff expects it more strongly because 
tortfeasors have an incentive to make the exploit seen by as many 
plaintiffs as possible: if plaintiffs give up on suing because they 
expect tortfeasors to win at trial by using the exploit, tortfeasors 
would reap the benefits of using the Maniscalco exploit without 
paying for its costs. However, even though the exploit is a winning 
strategy, tortfeasors may not be able to use the exploit in every case. 
For example, if the gains from harming a plaintiff are smaller than 
the time and money needed to protract a trial to full discovery, the 
exploit would not be cost-justified.  
To put the previous paragraph in game theory terms, neither 
party in the nth round of the ME model has a pure dominant 
strategy. Whether a plaintiff sues depends most significantly on 
how much she expects the tortfeasor to use the Maniscalco exploit; 
whether the tortfeasor uses it depends on, among others, whether 
the plaintiff sues and whether it is cost-justified. However, 
although both parties lack pure dominant strategies, each can adopt 
a mixed strategy that makes the other party indifferent among their 
strategies.126 For example, plaintiffs must switch between suing and 
 
 126. Cf. Rui Zhao, Gareth Neighbour, Michael McGuire & Pauline Deutz, A Software 
Based Simulation for Cleaner Production: A Game Between Manufacturers and Government,  
26 J. LOSS PREVENTION PROCESS INDUS. 59, 63 (2013) (“Game scenario two suggests that . . . 
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giving up often enough to make the tortfeasor indifferent between 
using the exploit and not using it. The logic underlying a mixed 
strategy is that of a penalty kicker, who must kick in different 
directions often enough to prevent the goalie from predicting 
where the ball will go.127 Thinking of the model in terms of mixed 
strategies also enables comparative statics, which allow closer 
examinations of the conditions that make litigants choose one 
strategy over another. 
 Game tree and sequence of play. Figure 2 shows the game tree 
depicting the nth round of the ME model, which consists of two 
stages. In the first, the tortfeasor (τ) decides whether to harm the 
plaintiff (π) and, if so, whether to misrepresent the state with 
genuine contacts with the tort. If the tortfeasor does not harm  
the plaintiff (abstain), the game ends. If the tortfeasor harms the 
plaintiff, the tortfeasor decides whether to commit the tort in a 
dummy state (misrepresent) or not (~misrepresent). Depicting the 
commission of a tort as a conscious decision is a stylization of 
reality because some tortfeasors cause harm unintentionally: for 
example, through negligence.128 However, I argue that this is a 
defensible stylization because, even in unintentional tort cases, the 
act that ultimately results in a plaintiff’s injury is often caused 
intentionally, and tortfeasors who are found liable are assumed to 
have been aware of the risk of causing the injury. For example, a 
principal who causes an unlicensed agent to drive is held liable for 
any resulting accident.129  
 
 
there is no dominant strategy in the game. Thus, a ‘mixed-strategy’ game scenario needs to 
be generated to establish the corresponding Nash Equilibrium.”). 
 127. See, e.g., Pierre-André Chiappori, Steven D. Levitt & Timothy Groseclose, Testing 
Mixed-Strategy Equilibria When Players Are Heterogeneous: The Case of Penalty Kicks in Soccer,  
92 AM. ECON. REV. 1138, 1142 (2002) (“[Under] the logic of mixed-strategy equilibria . . . the 
kicker’s probability of kicking to the center must make the goalie indifferent between jumping 
or staying . . . .”). 
 128. See, e.g., Borg-Warner Corp. v. Avco Corp., 850 P.2d 628, 633 (Alaska 1993) (“all 
unintentional tortfeasors, whether negligent, grossly negligent or wil[l]ful and wanton”). 
 129. See Mundy v. Pirie-Slaughter Motor Co., 206 S.W.2d 587, 588, 590 (Tex. 1947). 
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If the tortfeasor harms the plaintiff in the first stage, the plaintiff 
decides in the second stage whether to sue the tortfeasor, settle, or 
give up on a remedy. The dashed rounded rectangle connecting the 
plaintiff’s two decision nodes reflects the fact that this model, 
without the policy solution to the Maniscalco exploit presented in 
Part II, is a one-sided incomplete information game. That is, the plaintiff 
does not know whether the tort occurred in a dummy state, such 
that the plaintiff cannot know for sure whether the tortfeasor will 
use the exploit at trial until it is actually used; in terms of Figure 1, 
the plaintiff does not know whether the world is suboptimal or 
broken. The plaintiff does, however, know the likelihood that the 
tortfeasor will misrepresent, indicated by x and y, because of the 
Bayesian updating process shown in Section I.C.1. As for the 
tortfeasor, it knows the plaintiff’s likelihood of suing, settling, or 
giving up, indicated by w and z. 
Before describing the payoff terms of the game, a qualification 
is in order about how settlements work in the model. The model 
simplifies settlement negotiations by assuming that a plaintiff who 
wants to settle always offers the minimum payment acceptable to 
the tortfeasor, which the plaintiff knows in advance. In reality, 
parties to a civil case often settle only after a lengthy back-and-forth 
that informs them as to what each party is willing to accept and 
abort negotiations if they fail to agree on that amount.130 One may 
argue that a more realistic model would let the tortfeasor make an 
offer, let the plaintiff accept or reject, and resume trial if she rejects. 
However, the game abstracts away the process by which each party 
informs itself of the other’s preferences because the model’s goal is 
to study the workings and consequences of the Maniscalco exploit, 
not to faithfully represent settlement negotiations in all their glory. 
Payoffs. The nth round begins with the tortfeasor deciding 
whether to harm the plaintiff. If the tortfeasor abstains, neither 
party is affected, resulting in a payoff of (𝟎, 𝟎). If the tortfeasor 
harms the plaintiff and the plaintiff gives up, the tortfeasor gains in 
the value of the harm caused by the tort, and the plaintiff takes a 
loss in that same amount (𝑯, −𝑯), regardless of whether the 
tortfeasor misrepresented the origin of the tort or not. H is always 
 
 130. See Beverly J. Hodgson & Robert A. Fuller, Summary Jury Trials in Connecticut 
Courts, 67 CONN. BAR J. 181, 193 (1993) (“[S]ettlement negotiations break down because the 
plaintiff will not accept less than one amount, and the defendant will not make an offer above 
a lesser amount.”). 
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positive (𝑯 > 𝟎), because no tortfeasor would intentionally commit 
a tort that creates no gain or somehow harms itself. In Part I, I 
assume that damages are compensatory (damages are equal to the 
harm inflicted by the tort, 𝑫 = 𝑯).131 Part II introduces punitive 
damages as part of the solution to the Maniscalco exploit. 
If the tortfeasor commits a tort from a dummy state and the 
plaintiff sues (misrepresent-trial), the tortfeasor uses the Maniscalco 
exploit at trial. Hence, the tortfeasor’s payoff is the gain from the 
tort offset by litigation costs and the expected value of damages 
(𝑯 − 𝑪𝐓𝝉 − 𝒑 ∗ 𝑫), whereas the plaintiff’s payoff is the expected 
damages offset by the harm suffered and costs (−𝑯 − 𝑪𝐓𝝅 + 𝒑 ∗ 𝑫). 
Without the solution given in Part II, the plaintiff cannot win at trial 
if the tortfeasor uses the exploit (𝒑 = 𝟎); the payoff from 
(misrepresent-trial) is (𝑯 − 𝑪𝐓𝝉, −𝑯 − 𝑪𝐓𝝅). If the tortfeasor does not 
misrepresent and the plaintiff sues (~misrepresent-trial), the payoffs 
are identical to those in (misrepresent-trial), save for the fact that p is 
replaced by q: (𝑯 − 𝑪𝐓𝝉 − 𝒒 ∗ 𝑫, −𝑯 − 𝑪𝐓𝝅 + 𝒒 ∗ 𝑫). Because the 
tortfeasor does not use the exploit and the plaintiff would survive 
a motion to dismiss,132 the plaintiff has a chance to win (𝟎 < 𝒒 ≤ 𝟏) 
at trial in (~misrepresent-trial). The model assigns different costs to 
the parties (𝑪𝐓𝝉, 𝑪𝐓𝝅) because legal representation is often cheaper 
for corporate tortfeasors than it is for individual plaintiffs.133 
If the tortfeasor misrepresents and the parties settle (misrepresent-
settle), the tortfeasor’s payoff is the gain from the tort offset by 
transaction costs and the settlement (𝑯 − 𝑪𝐒𝝉 − [𝒑 + 𝒗] ∗ 𝑫), 
whereas the plaintiff’s payoff is the settlement payment offset by 
the harm from the tort and costs (−𝑯 − 𝑪𝐒𝝅 + [𝒑 + 𝒗] ∗ 𝑫). I depict 
the settlement as some fraction of the damages that would be paid 
if the plaintiff won at trial ([𝒑 + 𝒗] ∗ 𝑫), for three reasons. First, “the 
strength of a litigator’s bargaining position is at least partially a 
function of his or her willingness to try the case if settlement 
 
 131. “Compensatory damages are ‘[d]amages sufficient in amount to indemnify the 
injured person for the loss suffered.’” Desmond v. PNGI Charles Town Gaming, LLC,  
630 F.3d 351, 357 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 132. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 133. See Gilmore, supra note 121. Corporations can also reduce their legal costs through 
outsourcing, which is unavailable to individual plaintiffs. See H. Ward Classen, Recession’s 
Impact on In-House Counsel, 43 MD. BAR J. 42, 44 (2010) (“Many legal services . . . are conducive 
to outsourcing. Off-shore outsourcing of these functions allows corporations to significantly 
lower their legal costs . . . .”). 
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negotiations break down”;134 in misrepresent, that resolve is denoted 
by p, the plaintiff’s likelihood of winning at trial. Second, acceptable 
settlements are often calculated as a fraction of damages.135 Third, 
settlements can reflect the cost savings from avoiding a trial, even 
if it is based on frivolous claims.136 Hence, even if the plaintiff 
cannot win at trial because of the exploit (𝒑 = 𝟎), the parties may 
still settle (for example, 𝒗 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟓). If the tortfeasor does not 
misrepresent and the parties settle (~misrepresent-settle), the payoffs 
are identical to those in misrepresent, save for replacing p with q 
(𝑯 − 𝑪𝐒𝝉 − [𝒒 + 𝒗] ∗ 𝑫, −𝑯 − 𝑪𝐒𝝅 + [𝒒 + 𝒗] ∗ 𝑫). 
 
Tortfeasor’s equilibrium strategy and plaintiff’s comparative statics. 
Having presented the game and its payoff terms, I now derive the 
equilibrium mixed strategies for both players, beginning with the 
tortfeasor. Recall that each player’s mixed strategy must make the 
other player indifferent among their pure strategies.137 Therefore, 
the tortfeasor’s mixed strategy must make the plaintiff’s expected 
payoffs from each of her pure strategies equal. Figure 3 shows the 
two parties’ payoffs under every possible outcome, with the 
 
 134. Tracy Walters McCormack & Christopher Bodnar, Honesty Is the Best Policy:  
It’s Time to Disclose Lack of Jury Trial Experience, 78 TEX. BAR J. 210, 213 (2015). 
 135. See Gregory Todd Jones & Douglas H. Yarn, Evaluative Dispute Resolution Under 
Uncertainty: An Empirical Look at Bayes’ Theorem and the Expected Value of Perfect Information, 
2003 J. DISP. RESOL. 427, 447. 
 136. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in 
Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 503 n.10 (1991) (citing studies positing that 
“settlements of frivolous suits occur” because settlement is cheaper than going to trial);  
see also Russell Korobkin, Aspirations and Settlement, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 58 (2002)  
(“[T]he cost advantage of settlement relative to adjudication will decrease the longer 
negotiations proceed.”). 
 137. See Chiappori, Levitt & Groseclose, supra note 127. 
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likelihood of each action being taken by each party listed alongside 
the action: for example, the likelihood of the plaintiff giving up on 
a remedy is (𝟏 − 𝒘 − 𝒛). The tortfeasor’s equilibrium mixed 
strategy is to use each of its pure strategies according to the values 
of x and y that satisfy the following: 
π’s preference for trial over giving up. Because the tortfeasor’s 
mixed strategy shows the conditions in which the plaintiff is 
indifferent between all of her pure strategies, it can be used to 
examine the conditions in which the plaintiff is guaranteed to 
choose one strategy over another. Knowing those conditions can 
help predict how the parties will use and react to the Maniscalco 
exploit and design a policy solution to it. The nth plaintiff prefers 
going to trial to giving up if:  
 
π′s expected payoff from 𝐺𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑢𝑝 <  π′s expected payoff from 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 
−𝑥𝐻 − 𝑦𝐻 <  𝑥(−𝐻 − 𝐶T𝜋 + 𝑝 ∗ 𝐷) + 𝑦(−𝐻 − 𝐶T𝜋 + 𝑞 ∗ 𝐷) 
(𝒙 + 𝒚)𝑪𝐓𝝅 < 𝑫(𝒙𝒑 + 𝒚𝒒) 
 
In words, the plaintiff goes to trial instead of giving up on a 
remedy if her expected damages to be won under (misrepresent) and 
(~misrepresent) exceed her expected litigation costs. 
π’s preference for trial over settling. The plaintiff prefers going to 
trial to settling if: 
 
In words, the plaintiff goes to trial instead of settling if the 
difference between the expected damages to be won at trial and the 
settlement payment (−𝒗𝑫) is larger than the plaintiff’s cost savings 
from avoiding a trial (𝑪𝐓𝝅 − 𝑪𝐒𝝅). For example, assume that 𝑫 =
𝟐𝟎, 𝑪𝐓𝝅 = 𝟖, and 𝑪𝐒𝝅 = 𝟓. Further assume that the plaintiff is 
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offered a settlement payment that is 20 percent smaller than the 
damages that she would get if she won at trial (𝒗 = −𝟎. 𝟐). Then, 
the plaintiff would go to trial because the discount she must accept 
to her expected revenue is larger than the cost savings from 
accepting that discount (4 > 3). 
π’s preference for settling over giving up. The plaintiff prefers 
settling to giving up if: 
 
−𝑥𝐻 − 𝑦𝐻 <  𝑥(−𝐻 − 𝐶S𝜋 + [𝑝 + 𝑣] ∗ 𝐷) + 𝑦(−𝐻 − 𝐶S𝜋 + [𝑞 + 𝑣] ∗ 𝐷) 
(𝒙 + 𝒚)𝑪𝐒𝝅 < (𝒙 ∗ [𝒑 + 𝒗] + 𝒚 ∗ [𝒒 + 𝒗]) ∗ 𝑫 
 
In words, the plaintiff prefers settling to giving up if the 
transaction cost for settling is lower than the combined expected 
gain from settling under both misrepresent and ~misrepresent. 
Plaintiff’s equilibrium strategy and tortfeasor’s comparative statics. 
The nth-round plaintiff’s equilibrium mixed strategy requires her 
to use each of her pure strategies according to the values of w and 
z that satisfy the following equation: 
 
τ′s expected payoff from 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛
=  τ′s expected payoff from 𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡
= τ′s expected payoff from ~𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 
 
 
τ’s preference for ~misrepresent over misrepresent. The nth-round 
plaintiff’s equilibrium mixed strategy enables comparative statics 
that reveal the conditions under which the tortfeasor is guaranteed 
to choose one pure strategy over another in the nth round. The 
tortfeasor prefers not misrepresenting to misrepresenting if: 
 
τ′s expected payoff from 𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡
< τ′s expected payoff from ~𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 
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In words, the tortfeasor will avoid misrepresenting in the nth 
round if the plaintiff’s likelihood of winning at trial when the 
tortfeasor misrepresents is higher than the plaintiff’s likelihood of 
winning at trial if the tortfeasor does not misrepresent. 
τ’s preference for abstain over misrepresent. The tortfeasor prefers 
abstaining to misrepresenting in the nth round if: 
 
0 > (1 − 𝑤 − 𝑧) ∗ 𝐻 + 𝑤(𝐻 − 𝐶T𝜏 − 𝑝 ∗ 𝐷)
+ 𝑧(𝐻 − 𝐶S𝜏 − [𝑝 + 𝑣] ∗ 𝐷) 
𝑯 < 𝒘(𝑪𝐓𝝉 + 𝒑 ∗ 𝑫) + 𝒛(𝑪𝐒𝝉 + [𝒑 + 𝒗] ∗ 𝑫) 
 
In words, the tortfeasor will abstain instead of misrepresenting 
if the expected gain from a tort is smaller than the combined costs 
of going to trial and settling when the tortfeasor misrepresents. 
τ’s preference for abstain over ~misrepresent. The tortfeasor prefers 
abstaining to not misrepresenting in the nth round if: 
 
0 > (1 − 𝑤 − 𝑧) ∗ 𝐻 + 𝑤(𝐻 − 𝐶T𝜏 − 𝑞 ∗ 𝐷)
+ 𝑧(𝐻 − 𝐶S𝜏 − [𝑞 + 𝑣] ∗ 𝐷) 
𝑯 < 𝒘(𝑪𝐓𝝉 + 𝒒 ∗ 𝑫) + 𝒛(𝑪𝐒𝝉 + [𝒒 + 𝒗] ∗ 𝑫) 
 
In words, the tortfeasor will abstain instead of not 
misrepresenting in the nth round if the expected gain from a tort is 
smaller than the combined expected cost of going to trial and 
settling when the tortfeasor does not misrepresent. 
Discussion. The foregoing exercise highlights two significant 
predictions. First, consider the prediction that the nth plaintiff 
would sue instead of giving up if her expected damages to be won 
under misrepresent and ~misrepresent exceed her combined expected 
litigation costs ((𝒙 + 𝒚)𝑪𝐓𝝅 < 𝑫(𝒙𝒑 + 𝒚𝒒)). Assume, for example, 
that 𝑪𝐓𝝅 = 𝟏𝟎 and 𝑫 = 𝟐𝟎. Then, the plaintiff would sue if, for 
example, 𝒑 > 𝟎. 𝟓 and 𝒒 > 𝟎. 𝟓. Assuming that litigation costs stay 
constant but the amount of damages to be paid increases because 
the state awards punitive damages (for example, 𝑫 = 𝟑𝑯),138 the 
plaintiff would sue as long as 𝒑 >  𝟏 𝟔⁄  and 𝒒 >  𝟏 𝟔⁄ . This 
prediction comports with claims that, other things being equal, 
plaintiffs will be more likely to sue under the laws of states that 
 
 138. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 150 (West 2020) (“[A]n employee so 
aggrieved who prevails in such an action shall be awarded treble damages . . . .”). 
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award punitive damages.139 Plaintiffs would also be more likely to 
sue if they arrange representation under a contingency fee 
agreement, such that they do not directly bear the cost of litigating 
cases in which the exploit is used (𝑪𝐓𝝅 ≈ 𝟎).140 
Second, consider the prediction that, for the tortfeasor to 
commit a tort and misrepresent instead of abstaining in the nth 
round, the gain from a tort must exceed the combined expected cost 
of going to trial and settling when the tortfeasor misrepresents 
(𝑯 > 𝒘(𝑪𝐓𝝉 + 𝒑 ∗ 𝑫) + 𝒛(𝑪𝐒𝝉 + [𝒑 + 𝒗] ∗ 𝑫)). This may make the 
Maniscalco exploit seem unprofitable for many kinds of torts, 
because a profitable use requires the gain from a tort to be fairly 
large. Given the rather high cost required to justify using the 
exploit, the reader may wonder whether the nth round of the ME 
model accurately depicts what happened in Maniscalco. That is, the 
nth round of the model may seem to be arguing that the defendant 
in Maniscalco ate the cost of protracting a futile trial for years just to 
get away with selling defective printers to a handful of plaintiffs. 
However, that perception would be inaccurate because it is 
based only on what happens in the ME model in the short run. As 
stated in Section I.C, the ME model is an application of the chain-
store paradox, which depicts a chain store selling goods at a loss in 
the short run in order to muscle out local stores in the long run.141 
The early stages and the nth round of the ME model (𝒏 > 𝟏, 𝒏 ∈ ℕ) 
are equivalent to the short run in the conventional chain-store 
paradox. The tortfeasor’s long-run gains in the ME model can make 
up for its short-run losses because the plaintiffs who expect to lose 
at trial because of the Maniscalco exploit stop suing the tortfeasor 
in the long run—just as the chain store in the chain-store paradox 
recoups its short-run losses by selling at monopoly prices after its 
competitors have gone out of business. Section I.C.3 elaborates on 
this process, through the rth (𝒓 > 𝒏 > 𝟏, 𝒓, 𝒏 ∈ ℕ) and nth rounds 
of the model. 
 
 139. See, e.g., King Fung Tsang, China’s Rule of Law from a Private International Law 
Perspective, 47 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 93, 106 (2018) (“[D]ue to the favorable civil procedure 
rules to the plaintiff, such as . . . punitive damages . . . the United States has long been a 
magnet to international civil disputes.”); Smith Kline & French Laboratories Ltd. v. Bloch, 
[1983] 1 W.L.R. 730, 733 (Eng. C.A. 1982) (“As a moth drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn 
to the United States. If he can only get his case into their courts, he stands to win a 
fortune . . . . [American juries] are prone to award[ing] fabulous damages.”). 
 140. See Van Dorn, supra note 123. 
 141. See DRANOVE, BESANKO & SHANLEY, supra note 52. 
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3. The ME model: The repeated game, rth and nth rounds 
As explained in Section I.C.2, the tortfeasor in the ME model 
can recoup the losses incurred from using the Maniscalco exploit in 
the short run because plaintiffs may not sue the tortfeasor in the 
long run. This, in turn, allows the tortfeasor in the long run to reap 
the gains from the exploit without paying for the cost of using it. 
As for why plaintiffs with meritorious claims may decide not to 
sue, they may come to expect in the long run that the tortfeasor’s 
likelihood of using the exploit is too high to justify suing. Without 
the solution to the exploit given in Part II, plaintiffs may think that 
going to trial will consume years’ worth of resources only to end 
in defeat.  
The process through which plaintiffs acquire this expectation 
can be shown by using the Bayesian updating process presented  
in Section I.C.1 and the plaintiff’s comparative statics presented in 
Section I.C.2. 
Plaintiffs’ rational decision to give up. Recall that the plaintiff in 
Figure 2 prefers to give up on a remedy to suing the tortfeasor if the 
following inequality is satisfied:  
 
−𝑥𝐻 − 𝑦𝐻 >  𝑥(−𝐻 − 𝐶𝑇𝜋 + 𝑝 ∗ 𝐷) + 𝑦(−𝐻 − 𝐶𝑇𝜋 + 𝑞 ∗ 𝐷) 
 
In this inequality, x denotes the likelihood that the tortfeasor 
will misrepresent the origin of a tort in order to use the Maniscalco 
exploit, and y denotes the likelihood that the tortfeasor will not 
misrepresent. In other words, this inequality indicates that there 
may exist some x that forces a rational plaintiff to give up because 
the likelihood that the tortfeasor will use the exploit at trial is too 
high to justify litigating. Assume, for illustration, that 𝑫 = 𝑯 = 𝟐𝟎,
𝒑 = 𝟎, 𝒒 = 𝟎. 𝟖, and 𝑪𝐓𝛑 = 𝟏𝟎. As explained in Section I.C.2, 𝒑 = 𝟎 
because the plaintiff loses if the tortfeasor misrepresents, and 𝒒 =
𝟎. 𝟖 because the plaintiff has a good chance to win on the merits,  
if not for the misrepresentation and the exploit. Plugging these 
values into the inequality returns: 
 
−20𝑥 − 20𝑦 >  𝑥(−20 − 10) + 𝑦(−20 − 10 + 16) 
𝒙 >  𝟎. 𝟔𝒚 
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Under the previously stated values for 𝑫, 𝑯, 𝒑, 𝒒, and 𝑪𝑻𝝅,
𝒙 = 𝟎. 𝟒 and 𝒚 = 𝟎. 𝟓, to pick one example, guarantee that plaintiffs 
will give up on suing the tortfeasor in the ME model. 
This exercise returns two important predictions about the long-
term behavior of litigants in the ME model. First, plaintiffs need not 
believe that tortfeasors will always use the Maniscalco exploit 
(𝒙 = 𝟏) in order to give up on suing the tortfeasor. The previous 
paragraph showed that, assuming 𝑫 = 𝑯 = 𝟐𝟎, 𝒑 = 𝟎, 
𝒒 = 𝟎. 𝟖, and 𝑪𝐓𝛑 = 𝟏𝟎, 𝒙 = 𝟎. 𝟒 and 𝒚 = 𝟎. 𝟓 are sufficient to force 
plaintiffs to resign. Section I.C.1 already showed how Bayesian 
updating can increase the value of x from 0.1 to 0.3572 in one round, 
assuming that 𝒑 = 𝟎 and 𝒒 = 𝟎. 𝟖. Once x becomes high enough to 
force plaintiffs to resign, tortfeasors would reap the gains from the 
Maniscalco exploit’s deterrent effect without paying for its costs. 
These gains, in turn, could make up for any losses incurred from 
the cost of the exploit in the short run. 
Second, a tortfeasor may be able to predict when plaintiffs will 
give up on suing. Assume that x* is the minimum value of x that 
makes a plaintiff’s payoff from giving up larger than that from 
suing, and that b* is the number of trials it takes for x to reach x*. 
Assuming knowledge of the other traits relevant to the plaintiff’s 
resolve to pursue a remedy, the tortfeasor could derive the values 
of b* and x* in advance of harming the plaintiff. The growth rate of 
x would differ for each plaintiff, depending on things such as her 
level of trust in the legal system: the greater a plaintiff’s trust in the 
law to protect victims with meritorious claims, the slower she 
would be to catch onto the fact that the tortfeasor has already 
circumvented that system. 
Tortfeasors’ long-run gains from plaintiffs’ decision to give up. 
Having explained that tortfeasors may use the Maniscalco exploit 
at a loss in the short run to reap greater gains in the long run, I now 
proceed to explain how that calculation precisely works in the ME 
model. Recall that, in the nth round, the tortfeasor would abstain 
from harming the plaintiff instead of harming the plaintiff and 
misrepresenting the origin of that tort if: 
 
𝑯 < 𝒘(𝑪𝐓𝝉 + 𝒑 ∗ 𝑫) + 𝒛(𝑪𝐒𝝉 + [𝒑 + 𝒗] ∗ 𝑫) 
 
Put differently, the right side of this inequality is the cost of 
setting up the necessary conditions for using the Maniscalco 
1.KIM_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)   3/11/2021  12:54 AM 
371 Conflict of Laws for the Age of Cybertorts 
 371 
 
exploit, and the left side is the gain from doing so. Because the right 
side of the inequality includes the expected cost of litigating a trial 
in which the exploit is used and the expected cost of a settlement, 
the Maniscalco exploit may appear to be too expensive to be 
profitable for many kinds of torts. However, this inequality states 
only the costs and gains that occur from the Maniscalco exploit in 
the nth round. If a plaintiff decides not to sue the tortfeasor in future 
rounds, the gain from each future round would be H and the cost 
would be 0. Taking those gains into consideration, the tortfeasor 
may use the exploit at a loss in the nth round. 
To see how the tortfeasor incorporates expected future gains 
into its cost-benefit analysis, let us return to Figure 2. Assume that 
the parties are in the third round, the tortfeasor expects to gain from 
the Maniscalco exploit without using it beginning in the fourth 
round for ten rounds, and the discount rate is g. The future payoffs 
can be discounted to their present value using the formula for 
calculating the present value of an annuity142: denote the present 
value of the gains in the ten upcoming rounds as HF. Because the 
gain from each of the ten future rounds is H, the present value of 









Assuming 𝒈 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟑, 𝑯𝑭 ≈ 𝟖. 𝟓𝟑𝑯. Now, compare the conditions 
required for the tortfeasor to misrepresent instead of abstaining in 
the third round with and without expected future gains: 
 
With future gains: 𝟗. 𝟓𝟑𝑯 > 𝒘(𝑪𝐓𝝉 + 𝒑 ∗ 𝑫) + 𝒛(𝑪𝐒𝝉 + [𝒑 + 𝒗] ∗ 𝑫) 
Without future gains: 𝑯 > 𝒘(𝑪𝐓𝝉 + 𝒑 ∗ 𝑫) + 𝒛(𝑪𝐒𝝉 + [𝒑 + 𝒗] ∗ 𝑫) 
 
When future gains are expected, the tortfeasor would be able to 
tolerate a higher cost of setting up the necessary conditions to use 
 
 142. See WAI-SUM CHAN & YIU-KUEN TSE, FINANCIAL MATHEMATICS FOR ACTUARIES 41 
(2017) (calculating the present value of an annuity that is paid immediately). 
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the Maniscalco exploit and still make a profit, to a limit of 8.53H. 
Moreover, how tortfeasors use the exploit at high costs in the short 
run in view of greater gains in the long run could be generalized to 
rounds n and r, where 𝒓 > 𝒏, 𝒓, 𝒏 ∈ ℕ.  
Part I identified the legal basis of the Maniscalco exploit, 
presented the value of studying it, and modeled its consequences 
upon litigants’ strategic behavior. Part II proceeds to advance a 
solution—the so-called flashlight discovery ordered at the motion 
to dismiss stage,143 but limited to the choice of law issue—and 
models the potential consequences of implementing this solution. 
II. FLASHLIGHT DISCOVERY ON THE CHOICE OF LAW AS A SOLUTION 
TO THE MANISCALCO EXPLOIT 
Part I established that a prerequisite for using the Maniscalco 
exploit profitably is to induce plaintiffs to sue under the law of a 
dummy state, under which their claims would survive plausibility 
pleading but be dismissed for incorrect choice of law. Then, a 
solution to the exploit would be to conduct discovery on the choice 
of law issue—for example, on whether Brother’s allegedly tortious 
conduct emanated from New Jersey or Japan—at the motion to 
dismiss stage, so that plaintiffs would learn early on whether their 
case is futile. To minimize the likelihood of discovery abuse, the 
court would order discovery on the choice of law only for cases 
plausible enough to survive 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss.144 If early 
discovery reveals that the plaintiff has sued under the law of a 
dummy state, she could seek a court order for voluntary dismissal 
under Rule 41(a)(2)145 and sue under the law of a state that has 
genuine contacts with the alleged tort. Compared to dismissing a 
case after discovery, dismissing a case at the motion to dismiss 
stage is less likely to have drained a plaintiff’s funds so severely 
that the plaintiff cannot sue again. 
 
 143. See Miller, supra note 109, at 107 n.414 (describing the “considerable support” for 
conducting discovery pending a motion to dismiss at a limited scope). 
 144. Cf. Singh v. Google, Inc., No. 16-cv-03734-BLF, 2016 WL 10807598, at *1–2 (N.D. 
Cal. Nov. 4, 2016) (“[A district court’s] discretion extends to staying discovery upon a 
showing of ‘good cause,’ [under Rule 26(c)(1)(A)] . . . . Good cause for staying discovery may 
exist when the district court is ‘convinced that the plaintiff will be unable to state a claim for 
relief.’” (quoting Wenger v. Monroe, 282 F.3d 1068, 1077 (9th Cir. 2002))). 
 145. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) (describing the process for voluntary dismissal after a 
defendant takes court action). 
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Compared to the problem to which it is addressed, the solution 
of flashlight discovery on the choice of law is straightforward— 
so much so that some federal courts have already used it.  
In Aon PLC v. Heffernan, for example, “[d]ue to the significance of 
the choice-of-law determination as a threshold issue, the parties 
proceeded with discovery . . . on the choice-of-law question before 
any preliminary injunction hearing or other proceedings on the 
merits.”146 It should not be surprising that federal courts grant 
discovery on the choice of law issue during pleading; courts wield 
“wide discretion in controlling discovery”147 under Rule 26, which 
states that “methods of discovery may be used in any sequence” 
absent stipulations or court orders to the contrary.148 
If flashlight discovery on the choice of law question seems 
quaint, it is likely because courts and scholars have largely failed to 
notice the problem to which it is addressed, not because the 
solution is legally impracticable. Federal courts predominantly 
address motions to dismiss and then conduct discovery before 
resolving choice of law issues,149 or resolve choice of law issues 
using factual allegations in the complaint,150 both of which leave 
plaintiffs vulnerable to the Maniscalco exploit by letting futile 
litigation drag on long enough to drain their funds. As for the 
academy, legal scholars discuss discovery at the pleading stage as 
an aid for plaintiffs who lack the facts they need to make claims that 
would survive plausibility pleading.151 These plaintiffs are distinct 
 
 146. Aon PLC v. Heffernan, No. 16-cv-01924, 2017 WL 478270, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 6, 
2017), reconsideration denied, motion to certify appeal granted, 2017 WL 1430616 (N.D. Ill.  
Apr. 20, 2017). 
 147. Little v. City of Seattle, 863 F.2d 681, 685 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 148. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(3)(A). 
 149. See, e.g., Harper v. LG Elecs. USA, Inc., 595 F. Supp. 2d 486, 491 (D.N.J. 2009) 
(“[T]he Court will defer its choice-of-law decision until the parties present a factual  
record full enough to permit this Court to undertake the second step of the ‘governmental 
interest’ analysis.”). 
 150. See, e.g., Carton v. Gen. Motor Acceptance Corp., 611 F.3d 451, 454–55  
(8th Cir. 2010); Cooper v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 374 Fed. Appx. 250, 257 n.5 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 151. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 109, at 107 (“Contained discovery before the motion’s 
resolution could provide a fruitful middle ground for evaluating challenges to cases that lie 
between the traditional Rule 12(b)(6) motion based on the complaint’s legal or notice-giving 
insufficiency and a motion based on the complaint’s failure to meet the factual plausibility 
precepts of Twombly and Iqbal.”); Kevin J. Lynch, When Staying Discovery Stays Justice: 
Analyzing Motions to Stay Discovery When a Motion to Dismiss Is Pending, 47 WAKE FOREST  
L. REV. 71, 83 (2012) (“I do not believe that judges are required to interpret Iqbal so broadly 
that it require automatic stays upon the filing of motions to dismiss.”). 
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from victims of the exploit, who have the facts they need to make 
plausible claims that would survive motions to dismiss, but do not 
know that their cases will be thrown out after full discovery for 
relying on the law of a state with no real contacts to the tort at issue. 
However, flashlight discovery may not necessarily work upon 
implementation. If judges are too cautious to grant flashlight 
discovery for fear of adding to the already massive backlog of civil 
cases,152 the exploit would operate as if no solution had been 
implemented. The solution may fail also because plaintiffs who do 
not know that they are suing under the law of a dummy state do 
not move for discovery at the pleading stage. Conversely, if a judge 
is overly lenient as to grant discovery for cases that would not 
survive pleading or for cases in which the tortfeasor is not 
misrepresenting the origin of a tort, discovery at pleading would 
add to the case backlog and deter plaintiffs from suing by 
increasing litigation costs, thereby achieving materially identical 
results to those of the Maniscalco exploit in the long run. For want 
of a controlled experiment in which randomly selected judges grant 
early discovery, Section II.A instead models the potential outcomes, 
successful and not, of using flashlight discovery to address the 
Maniscalco exploit. 
Before proceeding to Section II.A, however, a qualification is in 
order about the flashlight discovery advanced by this Article. I am 
not proposing the pre-suit discovery that some scholars do, which 
would allow plaintiffs to conduct discovery before they file a 
complaint.153 The discovery I advocate would be limited to 
confirming the plaintiff’s existing choice of law allegations, and 
judges would grant such discovery only to plaintiffs whose claims 
have a nontrivial likelihood of surviving a 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss. Compared to pre-suit discovery meant to let plaintiffs 
gather whichever facts necessary to form a complaint, flashlight 
 
 152. See, e.g., Jessica K. Phillips, Not All Pro Se Litigants Are Created Equally: Examining 
the Need for New Pro Se Litigant Classifications Through the Lens of the Sovereign Citizen 
Movement, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1221, 1228 (2016) (“[w]ith more than 330,000 civil cases in 
the federal court backlog in 2015”). 
 153. See, e.g., Scott Dodson, Federal Pleading and State Presuit Discovery, 14 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 43, 46 (2010) (“This Article explores the role that state presuit discovery could 
play in rectifying the information imbalance caused by Twombly and Iqbal . . . . [T]he presuit 
discovery mechanisms can be implemented before any substantive claims are filed in  
a complaint.”). 
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discovery limited to the choice of law issue is more feasible 
legally154 and is less likely to cause discovery abuse by plaintiffs.155 
A. The Effects of Flashlight Discovery on the Choice of Law Issue     
upon the Maniscalco Exploit 
The success of flashlight discovery as a solution to the 
Maniscalco exploit depends most heavily on two factors: whether 
flashlight discovery successfully changes plaintiffs’ incorrect 
perception of the world (that the world is suboptimal), and whether 
the additional litigation costs created by flashlight discovery deter 
plaintiffs from suing. If flashlight discovery fails to inform plaintiffs 
as to whether the tortfeasor is misrepresenting the origin of the 
tortious act, tortfeasors would continue to win. If flashlight 
discovery works as intended but creates additional litigation costs 
that are so large as to dwarf the damages that would be paid, 
plaintiffs would be deterred from suing, even if they know that 
flashlight discovery will identify the true origin of the tort. Section 
II.A describes how these variables operate and how their adverse 
effects could be contained. 
Consequences of a successful use of flashlight discovery. As 
demonstrated in Section I.C, plaintiffs in the ME model may believe 
that they are in the suboptimal world (the first-round plaintiff), or 
suspect that they may be in the broken world (any plaintiff after the 
first). Both types of plaintiffs are vulnerable to the Maniscalco 
exploit: the first plaintiff will sue and lose, and any plaintiff after 
the first would either sue as the nth plaintiff does in Figure 2, or 
give up because they fear the exploit as the rth plaintiff does—both  
of which would prevent plaintiffs from being compensated. A 
successful use of flashlight discovery would prevent plaintiffs from 
wasting money on futile litigation and from giving up on suing, by 
creating two expectations: that tortfeasors may misrepresent the 
origin of the tort and that, if they did misrepresent, they will be 
exposed early on by discovery. In short, flashlight discovery aims 
 
 154. See, e.g., Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, Access to Information, Access to Justice: The Role 
of Presuit Investigatory Discovery, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 217, 227 (2007) (explaining that 
courts have found “nearly unanimously” that presuit discovery under Rule 27 does not allow 
plaintiffs to obtain facts needed to survive a motion to dismiss). 
 155. Cf. In re PrairieSmarts LLC, 421 S.W.3d 296, 305 (Tex. App. 2014) (“[C]ourts must 
strictly limit and carefully supervise presuit discovery to prevent abuse of the rule.”). 
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to change the repeated-game plaintiffs’ perception of the world 
from “suboptimal” or “broken” to “patched” (see Figure 4). 
Now consider the effect of flashlight discovery on litigation 
results. Assume that judges correctly identify claims brought under 
the law of a dummy state that would survive a motion to dismiss 
and grant flashlight discovery only for those claims. In this 
situation, the fact that judges order more discovery at the pleading 
stage than they used to would not increase the total amount of 
resources spent on litigation, and therefore would not add to the 
case backlog. If anything, flashlight discovery would be more likely 
to reduce the backlog by preventing plaintiffs from spending the 
years’ worth of time and money that they would have otherwise 
spent on futile litigation. Because discovery has informed the 
plaintiff about where the tortious conduct really happened, the 
plaintiff now sues under the law of a state where her claims will not 
be thrown out because of the choice of law issue. Because the 
plaintiff’s claims were already plausible enough to survive a 
motion to dismiss, both parties now know that she has a good 
chance to win at trial. 
 
Figure 4: Four Possible States of the World, After a Solution to 
ME Is Implemented 
Type Characteristics 
Optimal 
No one ever commits torts because tortfeasors 
would always lose 
Suboptimal 
Corporate tortfeasors sometimes win, due to the 
corporate-individual asymmetry in funds and 
legal representation 
Broken 
Tortfeasors practically always win, by using the 
Maniscalco exploit 
Patched 
Tortfeasors try to misrepresent, but are exposed 
by flashlight discovery 
 
Causes and effects of underusing flashlight discovery. Although 
flashlight discovery when used appropriately would address the 
exploit, it may be underused for two reasons. First, judges may 
hesitate to use discovery. Judges may not be able to distinguish 
claims filed under the law of a dummy state from those filed under 
the law of a state with genuine contacts to the case without actually 
using discovery. However, judges may not grant discovery at the 
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pleading stage because they are wary of adding to the case backlog. 
In this scenario, the judge is akin to a medical test that never returns 
false positives (no Type I error) but returns many false negatives 
(Type II errors).156 If judges are so cautious as  
to never use flashlight discovery during pleading, tortfeasors 
would continue to use the exploit to prevent plaintiffs from  
being compensated.  
Second, flashlight discovery may be underutilized because 
plaintiffs never ask for it. Recall that the first-round plaintiff never 
suspects that the tortfeasor will use the Maniscalco exploit because 
she has never seen it before. Therefore, she may never ask the court 
to order the discovery that would prevent the tortfeasor from using 
the exploit—one cannot ask for solutions to problems that she is not 
aware of. Although some federal courts have ordered discovery sua 
sponte,157 I find it unlikely that judges would order discovery on 
the choice of law issue of their own accord during pleading, when 
the prevailing doctrine appears to be so averse to doing so.158 
Causes and effects of overusing flashlight discovery. Judges may also 
overuse flashlight discovery for the same reason that they might 
underuse it: judges cannot distinguish cases in which the tortfeasor 
is misrepresenting the origin of a tort from the cases in which the 
tortfeasor is not misrepresenting. However, instead of not using 
flashlight discovery for fear of adding to the case backlog, judges 
might order flashlight discovery in nearly every case they preside 
over in order to catch misrepresenting tortfeasors. In this scenario, 
judges never return false negatives (no Type II error) but return 
many false positives (many Type I errors). This would drive up the 
per-case cost to litigate (CTπ ↑) by increasing the amount of time 
needed to resolve each case, which would ultimately add to the case 
backlog and deter plaintiffs from suing, even if they are certain that 
flashlight discovery would expose tortfeasors who misrepresent 
the origin of a tort. 
 
 156. See JESSICA M. UTTS & ROBERT F. HECKARD, STATISTICAL IDEAS AND METHODS  
380 (2006). 
 157. See, e.g., Hatfill v. Foster (Hatfill III), 415 F. Supp. 2d 353, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“I sua 
sponte ordered a fifteen[-]day period of jurisdictional discovery and directed additional 
briefing on the choice of law issue.”). 
 158. See, e.g., Snyder v. Farnam Co. Inc., 792 F. Supp. 2d 712, 712 (D.N.J. 2011); Carton 
v. Gen. Motor Corp., 611 F.3d 451, 454–55 (8th Cir. 2010); Cooper v. Samsung Elec. Am., 374 
Fed. Appx. 250, 257 n.5 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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The deterrent effect of increased litigation costs on the 
plaintiff’s willingness to sue can be demonstrated formally. Let us 
return to the nth round depicted in Figure 2, but assume that the 
overuse of flashlight discovery has driven litigation costs up; each 
party’s cost term now has a multiplier (𝜹 > 𝟏). Even if the tortfeasor 
misrepresents the origin of a tort, it cannot use the exploit because 
discovery would expose any misrepresentation; this means that 
𝒑 = 𝒒 and 𝟎 < 𝒒 ≤ 𝟏, such that the term representing expected 
damages (𝒑 ∗ 𝑫) in misrepresent survives. However, because 
flashlight discovery must be ordered in every case to expose 
tortfeasors, each case takes more time to resolve. Assume that 𝜹 =
𝟐, 𝑯 = 𝑫 = 𝟐𝟎, 𝒑 = 𝒒 = 𝟎. 𝟖, 𝑪𝐓𝝅 = 𝟏𝟎, 𝒙 = 𝟎. 𝟒, and 𝒚 = 𝟎. 𝟓. Then, 
the plaintiff is better off giving up than going to trial: 
 
π′s expected payoff from 𝐺𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑢𝑝 >  π′s expected payoff from 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 
−𝑥𝐻 − 𝑦𝐻 >  𝑥(−𝐻 − 𝛿 ∗ 𝐶T𝜋 + 𝑝 ∗ 𝐷) + 𝑦(−𝐻 − 𝛿 ∗ 𝐶T𝜋 + 𝑞 ∗ 𝐷) 
(𝒙 + 𝒚)𝜹𝑪𝐓𝝅 > 𝑫(𝒙𝒑 + 𝒚𝒒) 
𝟏𝟖 > 𝟏𝟒. 𝟒 
 
Recall that, in the ME model, the settlement paid to a plaintiff is 
proportional to her likelihood of winning at trial.159 If flashlight 
discovery has increased litigation costs to the point that it would be 
rational for a plaintiff to give up on suing the tortfeasor (for 
example, δ = 2), the tortfeasor would know that the plaintiff is 
unwilling to sue. As such, the tortfeasor would not pay a large 
settlement, and the plaintiff would therefore be better off giving up 
than settling as well. Assume, for illustration, that 𝒑 = 𝒒 = 𝟎. 𝟖,
𝒗 = −𝟎. 𝟔, 𝑪𝐒𝝅 = 𝟓, 𝒙 = 𝟎. 𝟒, and 𝒚 = 𝟎. 𝟓. Then, 
 
π′s expected payoff from 𝐺𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑢𝑝 >  π′s expected payoff from 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒 
−𝑥𝐻 − 𝑦𝐻 >  𝑥(−𝐻 − 𝐶S𝜋 + [𝑝 + 𝑣] ∗ 𝐷) + 𝑦(−𝐻 − 𝐶S𝜋 + [𝑞 + 𝑣] ∗ 𝐷) 
(𝒙 + 𝒚)𝑪𝐒𝝅 > (𝒙 ∗ [𝒑 + 𝒗] + 𝒚 ∗ [𝒒 + 𝒗]) ∗ 𝑫 
𝟒. 𝟓 > 𝟑. 𝟔 
 
Solutions to the unintended consequences of flashlight discovery. The 
foregoing exercise shows that the greatest  
obstacle to a successful implementation of flashlight discovery 
would be the difficulty of getting judges to order discovery at the 
 
 159. See supra Section I.C.2. 
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appropriate rate. If the problem is that judges underuse discovery 
during pleading, the solution may seem simple: force judges to 
order discovery more often. This could be accomplished either by 
amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or by changing the 
doctrine governing the practice of choice of law at the pleading 
stage; recall that the Third Circuit’s practice of resolving motions to 
dismiss and conducting full discovery before addressing choice of 
law questions stems from case law.160 
However, forcing judges to use flashlight discovery is more 
likely to lead to its overuse than an appropriate level of use, because 
of the catch-22 underlying this solution: judges must be able to 
identify the cases in which tortfeasors are misrepresenting the 
origin of a tort in order to grant flashlight discovery, but judges 
must grant flashlight discovery in order to catch misrepresenting 
tortfeasors. As demonstrated under the subheading causes and 
effects of overusing flashlight discovery, indiscriminate use of 
discovery at the pleading stage would increase the per-case cost to 
litigate by increasing the amount of time needed to dispose of each 
case. Hence, the solution of flashlight discovery may seem to 
present two options that both fail to address the exploit: either 
underuse flashlight discovery and let the exploit be used as is, or 
overuse discovery so that the worsening federal civil backlog 
would deter plaintiffs from bringing meritorious claims. 
Fortunately, the deterrent effect of flashlight discovery on 
plaintiffs’ willingness to sue can be addressed by increasing the 
expected amount of damages to be won—by stipulating punitive 
damages. As shown above, flashlight discovery could deter 
plaintiffs from suing because the litigation costs would dwarf the 
expected gains from winning at trial. However, assume that the 
value of D increases twofold to 𝑫 = 𝟐𝑯 = 𝟒𝟎, because the relevant 
state law is amended to allow punitive damages. Then, even if the 
values of all other variables stay constant (𝜹 = 𝟐, 𝑯 = 𝟐𝟎, 𝒑 = 𝒒 =
𝟎. 𝟖, 𝑪𝐓𝝅 = 𝟏𝟎, 𝒙 = 𝟎. 𝟒, and 𝒚 = 𝟎. 𝟓), the plaintiff’s payoff from 
going to trial would exceed her payoff from giving up. 
 
π′s expected payoff from 𝐺𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑢𝑝 <  π′s expected payoff from 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 
−𝑥𝐻 − 𝑦𝐻 <  𝑥(−𝐻 − 𝛿 ∗ 𝐶T𝜋 + 𝑝 ∗ 𝐷) + 𝑦(−𝐻 − 𝛿 ∗ 𝐶T𝜋 + 𝑞 ∗ 𝐷) 
 
 160. See, e.g., Snyder, 792 F. Supp. 2d at 712; Carton, 611 F.3d at 454–55; Cooper, 374 
Fed. Appx. at 257 n.5. 
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(𝒙 + 𝒚)𝜹𝑪𝐓𝝅 < 𝑫(𝒙𝒑 + 𝒚𝒒) 
𝟏𝟖 < 𝟐𝟖. 𝟖 
 
Because the plaintiff’s willingness to go to trial would 
strengthen her bargaining position, her payoff from settling would 
also exceed her payoff from giving up. Assume that 𝒗 = −𝟎. 𝟔. 
Then, 𝑫 = 𝟐𝑯 guarantees that the plaintiff will sue, despite higher 
costs created by flashlight discovery. Assuming again that 𝒑 = 𝒒 =
𝟎. 𝟖, 𝑪𝐒𝝅 = 𝟓, 𝒙 = 𝟎. 𝟒, and 𝒚 = 𝟎. 𝟓 returns: 
 
π′s expected payoff from 𝐺𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑢𝑝 <  π′s expected payoff from 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒 
(𝒙 + 𝒚)𝑪𝐒𝝅 < (𝒙 ∗ [𝒑 + 𝒗] + 𝒚 ∗ [𝒒 + 𝒗]) ∗ 𝑫 
𝟒. 𝟓 < 𝟕. 𝟐 
 
Arguments against the solution of flashlight discovery and punitive 
damages. Some may argue against the solution advanced above. 
First, one may argue that punitive damages would exacerbate the 
docket overload,161 which would have already been exacerbated by 
the overuse of flashlight discovery. However, flashlight discovery 
and punitive damages combined may in fact reduce the civil docket 
overload: if tortfeasors expect plaintiffs to sue despite high 
litigation costs and expect to pay substantial damages, tortfeasors 
may avoid using the exploit or even abstain from harming the 
plaintiff altogether. Recall that, in the rth round of the ME model 
without flashlight discovery, the plaintiff’s expectation that she will 
lose deters her from suing; the same mechanism could force a 
tortfeasor who expects to lose and pay through the nose to avoid 
harming the plaintiff. In other words, the equilibrium effect of 
flashlight discovery and punitive damages on the docket is an 
empirical question that is beyond the scope of this Article. 
Second, one may argue that flashlight discovery and punitive 
damages are unnecessary because plaintiffs might develop on their 
own the ability to identify misrepresenting tortfeasors before filing 
a complaint; after all, the means to disguise one’s physical location 
while acting through the internet are not foolproof.162 If plaintiffs or 
their counsel do develop the ability to catch misrepresenting 
 
 161. Cf. Tsang, supra note 139 at 106 (arguing that favorable procedural rules, such as 
punitive damages, induce international plaintiffs to sue in the United States). 
 162. See Kaminski, supra note 37 at 822. 
1.KIM_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)   3/11/2021  12:54 AM 
381 Conflict of Laws for the Age of Cybertorts 
 381 
 
tortfeasors on their own, that would indeed be a welcome 
development that makes it unnecessary to further complicate our 
already excessively complicated civil litigation system. However,  
I argued in Section I.A that, as of now, plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ 
counsel appear to lack the technological sophistication needed to 
engage in digital forensics and an awareness of the importance of 
cybersecurity practices.163  
At any rate, even if it is assumed that flashlight discovery 
becomes redundant because plaintiffs develop the ability to 
identify misrepresenting tortfeasors on their own, punitive 
damages may still be necessary because misrepresentation by 
tortfeasors could increase plaintiffs’ pretrial investigation costs, 
which would increase litigation costs, which in turn could deter 
plaintiffs from suing—if not for the expectation of higher damages. 
Scholars already argue that there exists a “cost asymmetry” among 
litigants because “[w]hile the plaintiff must expend resources to 
establish each of the elements of her cause of action, the defendant 
can concentrate on a single defense.”164 Adding the need to identify 
where a tortfeasor committed a tortious act would add to this cost 
asymmetry. The precise impact of this cost increase would, again, 
be an empirical question. However, the point remains that, ceteris 
paribus, added costs would deter plaintiffs with meritorious claims 
from suing, and that punitive damages would offset those costs. 
III. WHY IS CONFLICT OF LAWS SCHOLARSHIP PERCEIVED TO BE 
IRRELEVANT TO REALITY? 
Parts I and II established that conflict of laws scholarship can be 
practically useful, by showing how tortfeasors can exploit a choice 
of law loophole to profit from interstate torts. Why, then, is conflicts 
scholarship considered to be unhelpful to practice and irrelevant to 
reality? The fact that interjurisdictional transactions have never 
been more frequent165 indicates the timeliness of fixing conflict of 
laws, a discipline born to resolve interstate disputes. However, the 
fact that conflicts scholars have lamented the discipline’s decline for 
 
 163. See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text. 
 164. Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Empowering Individual Plaintiffs, 102 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1319, 1327–28 (2017). 
 165. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
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at least sixty years166 suggests that a cause may be difficult to 
identify and a fix may be difficult to implement. 
Yet existing works oversimplify the causes of, and solutions to, 
the decline of conflict of laws scholarship, even as they emphasize 
the value of reversing that decline.167 Some exaggerate the role of a 
single cause of the problem and the efficacy of a single solution: 
Professor Friedrich Juenger, for example, attributes “[t]he turmoil 
that currently besets choice of law” to insufficient attention to 
foreign law.168 Others misidentify the causes of the discipline’s 
decline by focusing too much on its symptoms. Professor Earl 
Maltz, for example, criticizes scholars who have “too great an 
intellectual investment in modern approaches to be persuaded by 
any arguments about the superiority of the prior law” and the 
discipline’s increasing reliance on “abstract arguments, often 
couched in pseudo-sophisticated jargon.”169 Although academic 
complacency and obfuscation should always be criticized, to do so 
without thoroughly examining why they occur so often in conflict 
of laws is unlikely to create meaningful change. As such, perhaps it 
is only natural for Maltz himself to be skeptical that his criticism 
will change conflicts theory.170 
Part III identifies two reasons for, and two solutions to,  
the discipline’s decline. Section III.A argues that scholars’  
obsession with comprehensive, ideal choice of law rules at the 
expense of studying how existing choice of law rules immediately 
affect individual litigation outcomes has made scholarship 
unhelpful to practice. I then explain why conflicts scholarship  
has failed to act on an intuitive solution, to shift focus from  
macro-theoretical to micro-applied conflict of laws: scholars appear 
to misunderstand what practitioners want out of conflicts 
 
 166. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. 
 167. See, e.g., Joel P. Trachtman, Conflict of Laws and Accuracy in the Allocation of 
Government Responsibility, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 975, 981–82 (1994) (“At a time when 
conflict of laws issues . . . arise more frequently in tort cases . . . and rational allocation of 
government authority over multistate or transnational business has taken on greater 
importance, conflict of laws theory could hardly be in greater disarray. That disarray leaves 
many interstate and international problems unresolved . . . .”) (citation omitted). 
 168. See Juenger, supra note 47, at 1314. 
 169. See Maltz, supra note 48, at 547. 
 170. See id. (“I am not sufficiently naive to believe that anything said in this Article will 
lead to a large-scale retreat from modern conflicts theory and a concomitant resurgence in 
the popularity of the First Restatement.”). 
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scholarship. Scholars’ underappreciation of lawyers’ demand for 
advice that will immediately help in the courtroom would explain 
why, even as the field’s reputation for impracticality solidifies, 
scholars claim that the academy has failed to convince the bar of the 
true value of theoretical conflicts scholarship,171 or that creating  
a better choice of law theory will displace that reputation  
of impracticality.172 
Following Section III.A’s explanation for why practitioners 
have abandoned conflict of laws, Section III.B explains why 
scholars have lost faith in the discipline. Prevailing accounts claim 
that abstruse analysis and hairsplitting jargon have repelled 
scholars from the field173 or that scholars who push certain theories 
have given the field a bad name.174 I submit that the first 
explanation confuses a symptom of the discipline’s decline for its 
cause, and that the second blames a subset of conflicts scholars for 
a fault shared by the broader field. Section III.B argues that 
overcomplexity is a symptom of unfalsifiable argumentation. 
Unfalsifiable argumentation prevents anyone from being proven 
wrong, which enables scholars to use the kind of “pseudo-
sophisticated jargon”175 that conflicts scholars are accused of using 
without being contradicted. The fact that no one can be proven 
wrong enables the same debates to repeat themselves ad nauseam, 
by allowing anyone to claim that their opponents misunderstand—
or, in some cases, deliberately misrepresent176—them. I then 
propose formal modeling as a tool to aid logical argumentation in 
conflict of laws. 
  
 
 171. See, e.g., Little, supra note 43, at 233–34 (“For teaching, most existing casebooks 
squander the promise of Conflicts as a tool for broad understanding . . . . If future lawyers 
and academics do not experience the promise of Conflict of Laws analysis during their 
formative stages, they are less likely to push the discipline in new directions that 
accommodate changes in the legal, social, and technological landscapes.”). 
 172. See, e.g., Symeonides, supra note 95, at 1904, 1909 (attributing the discipline’s 
reputation for impracticality to “the complexity of the modern choice-of-law approaches” 
and calling for choice of law rules that accommodate “the conflicting needs of certainty  
and flexibility”). 
 173. See, e.g., Maltz, supra note 48; Little, supra note 50. 
 174. See, e.g., Posnak, supra note 98. 
 175. See Maltz, supra note 48, at 547. 
 176. See, e.g., Posnak, supra note 98. 
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A. An Obsession with Macro-Level Theory at the Expense of  
Micro-Level Application 
[I]n Currie’s defense . . . . Currie put forth the selfish-state 
analysis . . . to demonstrate how the theory worked. It was 
not supposed to be a guide to conducting interest analysis 
in actual cases—though unfortunately it seems to have been 
taken that way, especially by critics.177 
Since Joseph Beale, American conflict of laws has largely been 
dominated by two groups of scholars vying to replace the 
prevailing choice of law rule with a superior alternative. The first 
has called for a new a priori theory that would predict which state’s 
law would apply to any case and would logically justify why. The 
vested rights approach of the First Restatement was overthrown for 
using what many saw as arbitrarily chosen factors to reach 
unforgivingly rigid results.178 The Second Restatement’s most 
significant relationship rule was attacked for being so pliable that it 
could justify any result and, hence, lacking uniformity and 
predictability.179 Schools of thought such as interest analysis, 
comparative impairment, and the better rule of law have debated 
which rule is the superior regime since the 1950s to the present.180 
Meanwhile, the second group argued against any a priori choice of 
law rule designed to achieve theoretically “correct” results, with 
recommendations ranging from rules that prioritize predictability 
 
 177. Kermit Roosevelt III, Brainerd Currie’s Contribution to Choice of Law: Looking Back, 
Looking Forward, 65 MERCER L. REV. 501, 511 (2014). 
 178. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer & Raechel Anglin, Choice of Law Theory and the Metaphysics 
of the Stand-Alone Trigger, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1125, 1129 (2010) (arguing that judges came to 
reject the First Restatement because they “became increasingly unwilling to apply the law of 
a state with only a single contact with the dispute”). 
 179. See, e.g., Katherine Florey, Beyond Uniqueness: Reimagining Tribal Courts’ 
Jurisdiction, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1499, 1513 n.83 (2013) (“[T]he hallmark of the Second 
Restatement is its flexibility, allowing judges to apply it differently according to personal 
preference or their sense of the justice of the case.”). 
 180. See supra notes 96–97; see also BRILMAYER, supra note 51, at 22–42 (summarizing the 
historical development of schools of thought in American conflict of laws since Joseph Beale). 
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over logical consistency181 to having the judge choose whichever 
state law that would achieve substantively “just” results.182 
Although these groups make opposite arguments, they unite 
the vast majority of conflicts scholars in one respect: they both 
advance theories about how choice of law rules should work at the 
systemic level, akin to how macroeconomists study the economy as 
a whole. The discipline’s disproportionate focus on macro-level 
theory has relegated micro-level application of conflict of laws—
studying how existing choice of law rules actually operate at the 
level of individual trials—into neglect, a fact that practitioners have 
made clear by complaining for generations that conflicts 
scholarship consists of abstruse theory183 that is unhelpful to actual 
practice.184 The fact that scholars claim to have been aware of this 
dissatisfaction and that it has apparently not been resolved185 
prompts two questions. First, does the bar have a legitimate need 
for scholarship in micro-level application that scholarship on 
macro-level theory cannot fulfill? Second, if it does, why has the 
academy failed to pay more attention to micro-level application of 
conflict of laws? 
Practitioners and their clients can have a genuine need  
for scholarly work that applies abstract theory, even if they do  
not appreciate the metaphysical beauty of that theory in the same 
way that theorists do. Take, for example, the Navier-Stokes 
equations, which describe the motion of viscous fluids and are used 
to predict the weather.186 Theorists (mathematicians) might care 
about the equations because they present an unsolved 
 
 181. See, e.g., Ernest G. Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws,  
33 YALE L.J. 736, 750–51 (1924) (“[I]t matters less what the [choice of law] rule is than that it 
shall be certain and so far as possible uniform . . . . There is no reason . . . our courts should 
give up [traditional rules] in favor of any a priori theory which has no support other than that 
of the person advocating the same.”). 
 182. See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, The Marginal Relevance of Choice of Law Theory,  
142 U. PA. L. REV. 949, 952 (1994) (“[N]o comprehensive choice of law theory, whether 
consequentialist or rights-based, will or should supersede the judicial inclination to focus on 
substantive results in the cases before them.”). 
 183. See, e.g., Austin, supra note 9. 
 184. See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 7. 
 185. See supra notes 1–2, 10, and accompanying text. 
 186. See WILLI FREEDEN & MARTIN GUTTING, SPECIAL FUNCTIONS OF MATHEMATICAL 
(GEO-)PHYSICS 15 (2013). 
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mathematical problem,187 not because they are a useful tool. 
Practitioners (meteorologists) may care about the equations 
because they can be used to predict when the next natural disaster 
will come,188 not because they want to find global solutions to the 
three-dimensional Navier-Stokes equations. I, a client of the 
practitioners, want to avoid drowning in a flash flood but do not 
care whether the weather forecasts come out of a supercomputer  
or a crystal ball, as long as they are accurate. Just as  
non-mathematicians can have a genuine need for accurate weather 
forecasts, lawyers who do not care about theory (as well as their 
clients) can have a genuine need for conflicts scholarship that will 
help them in the courtroom. 
None of this is to disparage the value of macro-level legal 
theory. It would undoubtedly be valuable to create an a priori 
choice of law theory that would predict which state’s law would 
apply to any given case and would logically justify why, because a 
law becomes more legitimate when people understand and accept 
why it limits their behavior. For example, people are more likely to 
justify “severe punishment such as the loss of liberty” for crimes 
such as murder189 than for crimes such as “sing[ing] or render[ing] 
the ‘Star Spangled Banner’ . . . as dance music.”190 I am merely 
arguing that, for example, a public defender can have a genuine 
need for law review articles on how courts handle habeas petitions 
without caring about constitutional theory, and her client can want 
to leave prison without caring about how it happens as long as it 
happens legally. 
However, conflict of laws has failed to pay due attention to 
application because scholars misunderstand what practitioners 
 
 187. See, e.g., Charles L. Fefferman, Existence and Smoothness of the Navier-Stokes 
Equation 2 (unpublished manuscript), http://www.claymath.org/sites/default/ 
files/navierstokes.pdf (“[The existence of solutions in two dimensions] gives no hint about 
the three-dimensional case, since the main difficulties are absent in two dimensions.”).  
The Clay Mathematics Institute has offered $1 million for a proof. See Navier–Stokes Equation, 
CLAY MATHEMATICS INSTITUTE (Sept. 28, 2020, 9:36 AM), http://www.claymath.org/ 
millennium-problems/navier%E2%80%93stokes-equation. 
 188. See, e.g., John Schwartz, 25 States Are at Risk of Serious Flooding This Spring, U.S. 
Forecast Says, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/21/climate/ 
climate-change-flooding.html. 
 189. See United States v. Alton Box Bd. Co., No. 76 CR 199, 1977 WL 1374, at *6  
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 1977) (distinguishing mala in se crimes from mala prohibita crimes). 
 190. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 264, § 9 (West 2020) (imposing a fine of “not more than 
one hundred dollars” for the act). 
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want from scholarship. That is, the academy seems to believe that 
the bar criticizes scholars for neglecting application because 
practitioners fail to appreciate the value of theory in the same way 
that scholars do. For example, many conflicts scholars have 
assigned a substantial share of the blame for the discipline’s 
reputation among practitioners as “desolate” and “sad” to the 
practitioners’ own failure to understand abstract scholarly theory: 
 How does one restate gibberish? Anyone who looks at 
American judicial opinions dealing with choice-of-law issues 
must conclude that the field is in a desolate state. . . . [J]udicial 
prose has an Alice-in-Wonderland kind of quality: one reads 
about “contacts” and “interests” as if these concepts were pretty 
much the same thing, or perhaps closely related . . . .  
 Even more depressing, however, at least to those who teach the 
subject, is the disarming candor with which some judges deplore 
the “post-revolutionary” conflicts law. . . .  
 . . . [O]ne cannot help but shudder when thinking about the 
Supreme Court’s taking an active role in this field considering 
what it has done to the far simpler subject of jurisdiction. And yet, 
some conflicts scholars have urged the Justices to take a more 
active role . . . .  
 . . . . 
 . . . [C]onflicts law . . . is in a sad and unrestateable shape. . . . 
 . . . .  
 . . . [O]ne cannot even trust judicial opinions to adhere 
faithfully to the doctrines they claim to follow.191 
Juenger and those who agree with him may well be correct that 
most judges confuse their own errors in application for 
unintelligible theory. However, even if this claim is correct, 
blaming the bar for not understanding the law will not help keep 
conflict of laws on the bar exam. Faulting judges for not 
understanding high conflicts theory is like faulting mechanical 
 
 191. Friedrich K. Juenger, A Third Conflicts Restatement?, 75 IND. L.J. 403, 403–04,  
410 (2000) (footnotes omitted); see also KERMIT ROOSEVELT III, CONFLICT OF LAWS 68 (2010) 
(“[J]udges tend to ignore or misunderstand even quite basic features of most choice-of-law 
approaches, and the difference between comparative impairment and balancing is likely to 
escape them entirely.”); Little, supra note 50, at 927 (“[T]he type of hairsplitting that occurs 
in conflicts has considerably damaged the reputation of lawyers . . . .”). 
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engineers for not understanding string theory well enough to write 
a dissertation on it. To avoid cementing the field’s reputation as an 
echo chamber of self-righteous zealots, scholars must focus less on 
proselytizing their idea of ideal a priori choice of law rules and 
more on studying how existing rules affect individual litigation 
outcomes. The need to clarify macro-level theory by showing how 
it works at the micro-level is especially acute in conflict of laws, 
because many of the scholars themselves have contributed to 
muddling the theoretical landscape by apparently misrepresenting 
the theory.192 
If Juenger and his camp seem to be an extremely vocal minority, 
they are not. Granted, not all scholars go so far as to fault judges for 
deliberately misapplying theory.193 However, like Juenger and 
company, many other conflicts scholars also place a large share of 
the blame for the discipline’s reputation for impracticality on the 
bar’s failure to grasp conflict of laws theory—even though 
practitioners should not be expected to appreciate high theory in 
the same way that scholars do. Take, for example, Professor Laura 
Little’s claim that conflict of laws is taken to be “irrelevant” because 
law students and the bar do not appreciate the value of abstract 
conflicts theory, which in turn is because of the academy’s failure 
to teach the discipline properly: 
 Conflict of Laws presents opportunities for meaningful 
reflection on legal regulation and governmental structure. . . . In 
the course of resolving conflicts issues, legal thinkers can develop 
a deep understanding of the nature of law itself. . . . [M]any 
perceive the field as arcane, dry, and possibly even irrelevant. 
Conflict of Laws is none of these things. . . .  
 . . . The essay provides raw material for scholars and practicing 
lawyers, who . . . have the ability to raise the consciousness of 
others about their contemporary importance. . . .  
 . . . . 
 . . . Plain words about the emotional, contemporary, and 
practical implications of Conflicts doctrine can help hook the 
 
 192. See, e.g., Maurice Rosenberg, The Comeback of Choice-of-Law Rules, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 
946, 950–51 (1981) (explaining that “Currie’s followers deny the validity of invoking a set of 
external theorems that point a priori to a ‘correct’ choice of law” but that many of them have 
“defect[ed] from Currie’s no-rules methodology”). 
 193. See, e.g., ROOSEVELT, supra note 191. 
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listener. Yet the profound, abstract questions that comprise 
Conflicts of Laws are what the discipline make so important. The 
challenge then is to . . . capture both the practical and theoretical 
richness in the subject matter. 
 . . . [M]ost . . . casebooks squander the promise of Conflicts as 
a tool for broad understanding.194 
It is only natural for a committed academic to criticize bad 
teaching, and Little’s essay may well be the manual that the field 
needs to effectively teach abstract conflict of laws theory. However, 
improved instruction in high theory is unlikely to change the field’s 
reputation of impracticality in the way that Little envisions, 
because practitioners are unlikely to develop a sudden interest in 
profound debates on the nature of law if scholars will not provide 
immediately helpful advice on how to win at trial. If, after decades 
of complaints that the discipline is unhelpful to practice, the 
academy still thinks that the practical implications of conflict of 
laws are there merely to “hook the listener[,]”195 the bar will 
continue to believe that scholars care only about proselytizing “a 
priori theor[ies] which ha[ve] no support other than that of the 
person advocating the same.”196 Although we are free to teach 
students whatever theory we want, we must swallow that burning 
desire when dealing with practicing lawyers and instead write 
more scholarship on micro-level application; the alternative 




 194. See Little, supra note 43, at 231, 233–34 (footnote and citation omitted). 
 195. Id. at 233 (italics removed). 
 196. See Lorenzen, supra note 181, at 751. 
1.KIM_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)  3/11/2021  12:54 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 46:2 (2021) 
390 
 
B. Unfalsifiable Argumentation: The Cause of Generations of Fruitless 
Debates Ad Nauseam 
The new critics of interest analysis . . . do not fully 
understand what they criticize[.] 
—Bruce Posnak,197 1988 
[T]he best way to get beyond Currie is to debate him one last 
time in order to put [interest analysis] in perspective. 
—Larry Kramer,198 1991 
State courts . . . misunderstand completely what Brainerd 
Currie meant by a ‘state interest[.]’ 
—Katherine Florey,199 2015 
The argument advanced in Section III.A, that conflict of laws 
scholarship is considered to be impractical because it is concerned 
excessively with macro-level theory at the expense of micro-level 
application, explains why the practitioners have lost faith in the 
field, but not why the theorists also unanimously claim to be sick 
of it. To a layperson, the fact that conflict of laws scholars are 
enamored with high theory may suggest that they should have no 
problem continuing to obsess over “Delphic” wording and 
“disagree as to what it means but agree that they adore it.”200 Year 
after year, however, conflicts scholars in fact lament the demise of 
conflict of laws theory, even as they continue to produce more of 
it.201 As far as I am aware, no other discipline can claim to match 
the strange phenomenon that we have seen in this one for 
generations: the academy speaks loudly and unanimously of the 
value of resurrecting sound conflicts theory202 but apparently 
 
 197. Bruce Posnak, Choice of Law: Interest Analysis and Its “New Crits,” 36 AM. J. COMPAR. 
L. 681, 727 (1988). 
 198. Larry Kramer, More Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws,  
24 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 245, 246 (1991). 
 199. Florey, supra note 2, at 686 (footnote omitted). 
 200. Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 460. 
 201. See supra notes 8–10. 
 202. See supra notes 43–46. 
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agrees that the task is infeasible,203 while being roundly criticized 
by the bar for wasting time.204 
Those familiar with the tortured history of this discipline may 
explain that the theorists are leaving because they have argued over 
the identical claims for decades, such as those on the merits of 
interest analysis cited at the beginning of Section III.B. Many of 
these interlocutors blame others’ misunderstanding of their 
arguments—willful205 and otherwise206—for the nauseatingly long 
duration of this debate. However, attributing decades of stasis in 
conflict of laws to the discipline’s most eminent names all 
simultaneously becoming sinister or witless is plainly implausible. 
I argue that what many conflicts scholars have called a 
misunderstanding of choice of law theories is merely a symptom: 
scholars have left the discipline because of their own reliance on 
unfalsifiable argumentation, which has enabled endless squabbling 
over the exact same topics by preventing anyone from being proven 
wrong, thereby allowing anyone to claim to be misunderstood. 
1. Anyone can claim to be misunderstood when no one can be proven wrong 
Unfalsifiable arguments prevent meaningful debate by 
allowing the debaters to repeat the same claims without being 
contradicted. When I say that a claim is unfalsifiable, I mean that it 
lacks objective and testable parameters.207 For example, the claim 
that cats are cuter than dogs is unfalsifiable because there is no 
objective agreement on what makes a species cuter than another. 
The claim that “God exists because the Bible says so, and the Bible 
is true because God says so” is unfalsifiable because it relies on 
circular logic: the claim that God exists and the claim that the Bible 
is true rely on each other as evidence, and there is no standalone 
way to test either claim. Because unfalsifiable arguments cannot be 
 
 203. See, e.g., Juenger, supra note 191. 
 204. See, e.g., Trachtman, supra note 167, at 978 (“Conflict of laws is a source of constant 
embarrassment to lawyers, judges, and scholars.”). 
 205. See, e.g., Posnak, supra note 98, at 1131. 
 206. See, e.g., Kermit Roosevelt III & Bethan R. Jones, The Draft Restatement (Third) of 
Conflict of Laws: A Response to Brilmayer & Listwa, 128 YALE L.J. F. 293, 301 (2018)  
(arguing that Brilmayer and Listwa’s critique of the Draft Restatement is based on  
a “misunderstand[ing]”). 
 207. See Brilmayer & Kim, supra note 116, at 23–29 (discussing how international law 
scholars have used unfalsifiable argumentation to present value judgments as scientific 
claims and to avoid being proven wrong). 
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contradicted, they can protract debates ad infinitum just by being 
repeated. At the same time, purveyors of unfalsifiable arguments 
can deflect blame for endless debates by claiming that their 
opponents misunderstand them. For example, one may dismiss 
dog lovers as “plainly lacking in intelligence”208 or non-Christians 
as not “understanding that they need a savior” because they 
subscribe to “lies straight from the pit of hell.”209 
Conflict of laws scholars have too often used unfalsifiable 
argumentation and accused their opponents of misunderstanding 
it. Take, for example, the claims made by some followers of 
governmental interest analysis, the choice of law rule that would 
apply the law of the state with the greater policy interest in a case 
and perhaps the most debated school of thought in the field’s 
modern history.210 In 1985, Professor Lea Brilmayer famously 
argued that interest analysis is not the objective method that its 
proponents present it as because it lacks a value-neutral means for 
determining “policy interests” underlying a state law. Because 
there is no agreement on what a state’s interests are, Professor 
Brilmayer argued, defenders of interest analysis can dress up their 
own preferences as state interests and present choice of law 
decisions based on them as unbiased: 
 Policy has been drained of meaning, perhaps in order to 
accommodate so many different viewpoints about what ought to 
be considered. . . .  
 . . . [Currie’s] methods supposedly . . . attempted to decide as 
the legislature would have decided had it addressed the issue . . . .  
 While apparently clear in principle, this methodology is 
somewhat difficult to apply. Most legal rules have no direct 
instructions on their intended range of application. . . .  
 
 208. Chris Matyszczyk, Cat People Are Smarter than Dog People, Study Says, CNET  
(June 1, 2014, 1:15 PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/cat-people-are-smarter-than-dog-
people-study-says/. 
 209. Matt Pearce, U.S. Rep. Paul Broun: Evolution a Lie “From the Pit of Hell,” L.A. TIMES 
(Oct. 7, 2012, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-xpm-2012-oct-07-la-na-nn-
paul-broun-evolution-hell-20121007-story.html. 
 210. See, e.g., Harold P. Southerland, Conflict of Laws in Florida: The Desirability of 
Extending the Second Restatement Approach to Cases in Contract, 21 NOVA L. REV. 777, 805 (1997) 
(“Though [Currie’s] forum-law solution has not been widely adopted, there is still nothing 
approaching general agreement about how true conflicts should be resolved. It is the most 
hotly debated issue in choice-of-law today.”). 
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 . . . . 
 All of this talk about willingness to defer to state policy 
decisions is pure bunk. . . . Interest analysis is not a value neutral 
methodology that simply seeks implementation of the policy 
preferences of the legislature or common law court. Interest 
analysts have a very strong set of normative premises which 
enable them to contradict or belittle the preferences of legislatures 
and courts if those preferences resemble that “dogma,” that 
“sterile formalism,” that “mindless and ruthless machine,” the 
First Restatement of Conflicts. . . . The illustrative examples [used 
by proponents of interest analysis, including Currie,] simply 
indicate what interest analysts think that legislatures ought to 
want.211 
In response, Professor Robert Sedler argued that Professor 
Brilmayer fails to understand how interest analysis decides 
whether a state has an interest and which law to apply to a 
given case: 
 Professor Brilmayer . . . is not particularly concerned about 
how interest analysis works in practice or about the results that 
are produced by the application of that approach. . . .  
 . . . . 
 According to Currie, it is rational to make choice of law 
decisions with reference to the policies reflected in the laws of the 
involved states, and the interest of each state, in light of those 
policies, in having its law applied on the point in issue in the 
particular case. . . .  
 . . . . 
 . . . It is only where the application of a state’s law cannot be 
sustained either on the basis of the state’s interest in advancing 
the policy reflected in that law, or on the basis of factual 
connections between the underlying transaction and the state, 
that such application is unreasonable . . . .  
 . . . . 
 Choice of law decisions . . . should be made with reference to 
the policies reflected in the laws of the involved states and the 
 
 211. Lea Brilmayer, Governmental Interest Analysis: A House Without Foundations,  
46 OHIO STATE L.J. 459, 459, 464, 469–70 (1985) (footnotes omitted). 
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interest of each state, in light of those policies, in having its law 
applied . . . [to a] particular case. The justification for interest 
analysis is that it is rational to make choice of law decisions on  
this basis . . . .212 
Professor Sedler’s argument, that interest analysis works 
because it is rational, is unfalsifiable for the same reason that “cats 
are cuter than dogs” is unfalsifiable: like the term “cuter,” the 
material word “rational” has no objective definition. Sedler’s 
definition of “unreasonable” as “where the application of a state’s 
law cannot be sustained . . . on the basis of the state’s interest” is a 
tautology because it merely repeats the claim that applying the law 
of the state with the greater interest in a case is reasonable, without 
defining what “interest” is. Throughout his entire article, Sedler 
repeats his claim that “interest analysis . . . works” because it 
provides “a rational basis for making choice of law decisions” 
without otherwise defining “rational,” while repeating in only 
cosmetically different ways the claim that Brilmayer 
misunderstands interest analysis. 
Nine years after Professor Brilmayer’s attack and Professor 
Sedler’s defense, followers of interest analysis continued to 
advance unfalsifiable arguments on its behalf. In 1994, Professor 
Bruce Posnak repeated the claim that Professor Brilmayer 
misunderstands interest analysis: 
Not only does [Professor Brilmayer] continue to refuse to “get it” 
and abuse Currie’s ideas, she has spawned a whole school of 
misinformed fry-critics . . . [who] have . . . infected both courts 
and practicing lawyers and adversely affected the law. . . .  
 . . . . 
 . . . Whether a state has an “interest” depends solely upon 
whether it is reasonable to conclude that a policy behind that 
state’s competing law would be advanced if that law were 
applied. . . .   
 . . . . 
 
 212. Robert A. Sedler, Interest Analysis as the Preferred Approach to Choice of Law:  
A Response to Professor Brilmayer’s “Foundational Attack,” 46 OHIO STATE L.J. 483, 483, 485, 488, 
490 (1985) (footnotes omitted). 
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 . . . [I]t is irrational for a state court to apply the law of some 
state when it is clear that no policy behind that law would be 
furthered but the policy behind the competing law would be. . . .  
 . . . . 
 . . . An “interest” arises if it is reasonable to conclude that one 
of these policies would be advanced if that law were applied to . . . 
the case before the court.213 
Professor Posnak’s argument is unfalsifiable because its 
reasoning is circular, like the claim that God exists because the Bible 
says so, and that the Bible is true because God says so. Consider the 
last two sentences in the excerpt cited above: according to Posnak, 
it is irrational for a court to apply a state’s law if that state has no 
interest in having its law apply, and an interest arises if it would be 
rational to apply that state’s law. Because the definitions of 
“interest” and “rational” rely on each other and Posnak’s article 
does not provide a standalone way to define them, his claim cannot 
logically be contradicted and can protract futile debate simply by 
being repeated. 
I will not belabor this point by listing more examples of conflict 
of laws scholars making unfalsifiable arguments, protracting futile 
debates, and accusing critics of misunderstanding and 
misrepresenting them, well into the present.214 The point of this 
exercise is that conflicts scholars who blame the discipline’s 
reputation for impracticality on other scholars and practitioners 
who allegedly misunderstand their claims may have no one to 
blame but themselves: it seems only reasonable to abandon a field 
whose noticeable advancements are in the number of ad hominem 
attacks exchanged between scholars, not in the quality of the 
arguments presented in their works. The alternative to my 
explanation, that unfalsifiable arguments have caused years of 
futile debate in conflict of laws, is to accept that its prevailing 
 
 213. See Posnak, supra note 98, at 1131, 1137, 1149, 1182 (footnotes omitted). 
 214. See, e.g., Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law,  
41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 295, 297 (1966) (advancing the “better rule of law,” which argues for 
“applying what by the forum’s standard is the better of the competing rules of law” without 
objectively defining “better”); supra notes 197–98; Roosevelt & Jones, supra note 38 
(responding to a critique of the Draft Third Restatement that it “retain[s] . . . the least 
defensible aspects of governmental interest analysis” by arguing that “[t]he Restatement 
draft does not follow Currie’s assumptions about state interests or his conclusions as to the 
scope of state laws, much less his views on how to resolve conflicts between them”). 
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theories are so genuinely complicated that our most eminent 
colleagues are all flummoxed by them. If that is the case, it hardly 
seems proper to fault practitioners for not understanding high 
theory that conflicts scholars themselves do not. 
2. Formal modeling as an aid for logical debate in conflict of laws 
As shown in Section III.B.1, unfalsifiable argumentation is a 
fairly simple fallacy to spot. However, the scholars who have 
argued against unfalsifiable claims in conflict of laws for years have 
failed to identify them as fallacies, even as they criticized those 
claims from a substantive perspective. For example, Professor 
Brilmayer, in over a decade of works criticizing interest analysis, 
focuses on its failure to clarify the roles of statutory construction 
and legislative intent in determining whether a state law should 
apply, as well as its failure to provide constitutional justification.215 
Substantive criticism such as this has failed to close futile debate, 
because users of unfalsifiable argumentation capitalize on its 
immunity to contradiction to simply repeat their claims. Had the 
fallacy of unfalsifiable argumentation been pointed out explicitly, 
perhaps unproductive theoretical debate in conflict of laws may not 
have lasted for such a long time. 
I submit that formal models would make logically sound 
debates in conflict of laws more likely by forcing arguments to 
explicitly state and quantify their underlying assumptions, so that 
they become resistant to misrepresentation by rhetorical 
massaging. This Article and the works in defense of interest 
analysis cited in Section III.B.1 have similar purposes, because they 
all argue that a choice of law rule will result in certain 
consequences. I argue that resolving the choice of law issue using 
plaintiffs’ allegations would incentivize tortfeasors to misrepresent 
the origin of a tort, whereas defenders of interest analysis argue that 
it would apply to a case the law of a state that has the greater policy 
interest in having its law apply. A difference between this Article 
and those in defense of interest analysis is that this Article 
quantifies and explicitly states the assumptions underlying the 
 
 215. See Brilmayer, supra note 211; Lea Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of 
Legislative Intent, 78 MICH. L. REV. 392 (1980); Lea Brilmayer, Methods and Objectives in the 
Conflict of Laws: A Challenge, 35 MERCER L. REV. 555 (1984); BRILMAYER, supra note 51, at         
44–47. 
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argument that tortfeasors would use the Maniscalco exploit, in the 
form of parameters in Figure 2 such as H. I could not rely on 
fallacies to present a claim that is not supported by my assumptions 
because anyone could check my work by solving my model. 
Although formal models have been used in other fields of legal 
scholarship216 and could easily be imported to conflict of laws, as 
shown by this Article, I wish to qualify my argument in favor of 
using formal models in conflict of laws in order to preempt any 
misunderstanding of my intent. First, I am not arguing for the use 
of formal models in all, or even most, conflict of laws research, 
because formal models cannot be used to present arguments whose 
assumptions cannot be quantified. For example, the claim that the 
Second Restatement returns more just results than interest analysis 
does, on its own, cannot be presented using a game-theoretic model 
because the value preferences that lead one to conclude that one 
choice of law rule is normatively superior to another cannot be 
quantified. Legal scholars have already been criticized for 
attempting to lend their value judgments a specious impression  
of quantitative authority by presenting them using misapplied 
game theory,217 a trend that would only further undermine this  
field’s reputation. 
Second, I am not arguing that game-theoretic models are 
inherently superior to any other research methodology. I support 
any research method that would make logically sound debate in 
conflict of laws scholarship more likely, and I am arguing that 
formal modeling is one of them. The social sciences have long been 
plagued by scholars’ dogmatic attachments to particular tools for 
research, which limit the range of research that scholars will 
consider, induce scholars to use methods that are inappropriate for 
a given purpose, and cause rarely used but nevertheless sound 
methods to be “denied the name of science.”218 I do not intend to 
contribute to introducing yet another Inquisition to a discipline 
already populated by “wild-eyed . . . intellectual zealots.”219  
 
 216. See, e.g., Erik Hovenkamp, Competition, Inalienability, and the Economic Analysis of 
Patent Law, 21 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 33, 71–73 (2018). 
 217. See Brilmayer & Kim, supra note 116, at 30–34. 
 218. Donald R. Kinder & Thomas R. Palfrey, On Behalf of an Experimental Political Science, 
in EXPERIMENTAL FOUNDATIONS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 1, 4 (Donald R. Kinder & Thomas R. 
Palfrey eds., 1993) (quoting ABRAHAM KAPLAN, THE CONDUCT OF INQUIRY 29 (1964)). 
 219. See BRILMAYER, supra note 51. 
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Finally, I am arguing for more use of formal modeling in 
conflict of laws because models make it easier to determine whether 
an argument is logically consistent with its assumptions, not 
because models necessarily indicate whether the argument and its 
assumptions accurately portray reality.220 No model describes 
reality completely accurately, because to do so would defeat the 
purpose of using a model: a model abstracts away some of reality’s 
complexities in order to study a particular phenomenon in 
isolation. However, a model with brazenly false assumptions 
serves no use because it would model things that do not occur in 
reality. Yet, too many scholars in other legal disciplines openly 
argue that a model need not be grounded in accurate assumptions 
about reality, as long as the model’s conclusions tell a plausible 
story.221 Presenting formal models in conflict of laws based on false 
assumptions would not only add to this mess, but also repeat the 
behavior that has plagued this field for decades: obsessing over 
theory with no bearing on reality. 
CONCLUSION 
Conflict of laws, despite its notorious past, has a starring role  
to play in legal practice and academia in the years to come.  
This Article has shown firsthand how conflicts scholarship could 
seize such a role by identifying and advancing a solution to a 
problem that will become only more prevalent and malignant in the 
age of cybertorts: corporations acting over the internet can exploit 
a loophole in territorially tethered choice of law rules to profit from 
interstate torts at the expense of plaintiffs with meritorious claims 
against them. This Article has also shown that conflict of laws 
scholarship has become notorious for impracticality not because 
the discipline is inherently unhelpful to practice, but because 
 
 220. See MORROW, supra note 116, at 1 (“Game theory cannot tell us whether certain 
theories are accurate descriptions of the world, but it can tell us what behavior we should 
expect as a consequence of those theories.”). 
 221. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 16 (2007) (“Newton’s 
law of falling bodies is unrealistic in its assumption that bodies fall in a vacuum . . . but it is 
still a useful theory because it predicts with reasonable accuracy the behavior of a wide 
variety of falling bodies in the real world.”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 
84 MICH. L. REV. 1696, 1706 (1986) (“What’s wrong with models that contain ‘unrealistic’ 
assumptions? The purpose of any model is to strip away complications, to make intractable 
problems manageable, to make things simple enough that we can see how particular 
variations matter.”). 
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scholars misunderstand what the bar wants from the academy and 
because they have debated one another in a way that obstructs 
scholarly progress. 
Although scholars contributing to their own reputation for 
unhelpfulness is particularly egregious in conflict of laws, legal 
scholarship more broadly is also guilty of the same. Scholars 
engage in a periodical, collective handwringing about the declining 
relevance of their works to reality,222 as if that ritualized admission 
of guilt licenses them to keep on sinning until the next confession. 
While recognition is the first step to solving any problem, claiming 
to have found a problem without making any progress serves only 
to cement suspicions that scholars are failing to address its central 
cause. Indeed, many point to the law review format as a main cause 
of legal scholarship’s declining relevance,223 as if to suggest that the 
unappealing content may become attractive in new clothes. 
Although law reviews may have a hand in the fall of legal 
scholarship, I maintain that the central cause of irrelevant content 
is irrelevant content. Attributing the falling relevance of legal 
scholarship to its publication format is like refusing to swim in 
shark-infested waters because of the risk of drowning, while 
ignoring the much higher risk of being eaten alive. 
Fortunately, some legal scholars are defying entrenched 
perceptions that “[w]hat the academy is doing . . . is largely of no 
use or interest to people who actually practice law”224 by producing 
timely research on some of the most pertinent issues of the day: for 
example, how the Supreme Court’s restrictive interpretations of the 
 
 222. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cure, 90 YALE L.J. 1205, 1205 
(1981) (“[L]egal scholarship lies at the edges of serious intellectual activity . . . .”);  
Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amok: Excesses in the Pursuit of Truth and Tenure, 103 HARV. L. 
REV. 926, 933 (1990) (“[A]midst the morass of law reviews are occasional stabs at candid self-
criticism. For example, various observers have noted that supposedly analytical 
commentaries are predominantly descriptive and mildly plagiaristic[.]”). 
 223. See, e.g., Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REV. 38, 38 (1936) (“[I]t is in 
the law reviews that a pennyworth of content is most frequently concealed beneath a pound 
of so-called style. The average law review writer is peculiarly able to say nothing with an air 
of great importance. When I used to read law reviews, I used constantly to be reminded of 
an elephant trying to swat a fly.”); Alan Watson, Legal Education Reform: Modest Suggestions, 
51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 91, 95 (2001) (“[L]egal education would be vastly improved if American 
law review articles of the typical sort were abolished.”). 
 224. Adam Liptak, Keep the Briefs Brief, Literary Justices Advise, N.Y. TIMES  
(May 20, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/21/us/politics/21court.html (quoting 
Chief Justice John Roberts). 
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extraterritorial effects of financial regulations can allow 
transnational corporations to harm any country, while staying 
beyond the reach of all of them.225 Conflict of laws, the discipline 
that governs the application of state laws to interstate activity, must 
immediately join and eventually lead this effort to redesign our 
territorial legal system to survive these interjurisdictional times. 
With everyday life becoming increasingly dependent on the 
internet, it seems that the deck is stacked in favor of conflict of laws. 
To win that game, we would only have to play it.  
 
 
 225. See William J. Moon, Regulating Offshore Finance, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2019). 
